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ABSTRACT
This Article explores a path in international law for recognizing
the right of the Palestinian population of the West Bank to Israeli
citizenship, based on the annexationist policies of Israel in the West
Bank. The scope of the obligation of states to confer citizenship on
individuals is determined by international human rights law
(“IHRL”). The Article shows that a plausible reading of the IHRL
treaty obligations of Israel suggests that it has a duty to grant
citizenship to individuals born in its territory, who would otherwise
be stateless, and that most West Bank Palestinians are currently
considered stateless. Therefore, if a given area of the West Bank is
considered to have become part of Israel, most Palestinians
subsequently born in such territory are plausibly entitled to receive
Israeli citizenship as a matter of treaty law. There also seems to be a
broad, emerging right under customary international law of the
residents of a territory acquired by a state to receive the citizenship
of that state, regardless of whether or not they would otherwise be
considered stateless.
The West Bank is a territory under Israeli occupation, and
annexation by an occupier of any part of the occupied territory
violates international law. The Article argues, however, that the
illegal annexation by Israel of an occupied territory would make that
territory a part of Israel for the limited purpose of the right to
citizenship, as an exception to the principle that illegal annexation is
null and void. Hence, the existing and emerging IHRL obligations
of Israel to grant citizenship to residents of territory acquired by
* Senior Lecturer, Ono Academic College.

271

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

272

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:1

Israel extend to Palestinians residing in areas of the West Bank
illegally annexed by Israel.
The Article argues further that, for the purpose of applying the
norms of IHRL that concern the right to citizenship, the definition of
annexation extends beyond formal annexation and encompasses de
facto annexation as well. Annexation of occupied territory results
from the occupier’s display of sovereignty in that territory, among
other things, by settling its own population in the occupied territory.
In view of the current spread of Israeli settlements across the West
Bank, unless Israel removes, within a reasonable time period, many
of these settlements, the entire territory of the West Bank may be
considered to have been annexed, and the entire Palestinian
population of the West Bank would have a strong claim to Israeli
citizenship under an emerging norm of international law.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2019, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu,
declared his intention to promote the formal annexation of parts of
the West Bank, a territory occupied by Israel since 1967. 1 The
planned annexation would encompass many or all Israeli
settlements located in the West Bank, but would not include
Palestinian urban areas.2 In August 2020, Israel agreed to suspend
its plan of formal annexation in order to normalize relations with the
United Arab Emirates.3 The length of the announced suspension,
and whether the annexation plan is carried out eventually, remains
unclear. If it happens, formal annexation would merely be the
culmination of five decades of Israeli annexationist policies
throughout the West Bank, manifest in the enterprise of Israeli
settlements in this territory.4 Much like the formal annexation plans,
the settlement enterprise generally targets territories outside
Palestinian population centers.5
1 Andrew Carey, Netanyahu Says Israel Will Annex Parts of West Bank if He is ReElected,
CNN
(Sept.
11,
2019),
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/10/world/netanyahu-israel-west-bank-jordanvalley/index.html [https://perma.cc/H4K8-G538]; Oliver Holmes, Netanyahu
Vows to Annex Jewish Settlements in Occupied West Bank, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/07/netanyahu-vows-to-annexe
-jewish-settlements-in-occupied-west-bank [https://perma.cc/2P45-CCGJ].
2
Oliver Holmes, Israel Signs Historic Deal with UAE that Will ‘Suspend’ West
Bank
Annexation,
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
13,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/13/israel-and-uae-to-form-dip
lomatic-ties-says-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/8RWK-QKH6] (citing a
statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu regarding his intention to promote the
annexation of all Israeli settlements in the West Bank). Formal annexation may also
extend to the Jordan Valley (an area amounting to roughly twenty-two percent of
the territory of the West Bank). See Carey, supra note 1; Data on Netanyahu’s Jordan
Valley
Annexation
Map,
PEACE
NOW
(Sept.
11,
2019),
https://peacenow.org.il/en/data-on-netanyahus-jordan-valley-annexation-map
(citing Prime Minister Netanyahu’s claim that no Palestinian would be annexed to
Israel as a result of the planned annexation of the Jordan Valley).
3
Holmes, supra note 2.
4 See discussion of the settlement enterprise, infra Part IV.a.
5
A report by B’tselem, an Israeli human rights NGO, observes that the Oslo
Accords, concluded between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization,
divided the West Bank into three areas based on demographic considerations. The
report proceeds to note that:
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While treating much of the occupied West Bank as its own, 6
Israel has excluded the Palestinian population of this territory from
its citizenry. Commentators have observed that the integration of
West Bank territories into Israel through the settlements enterprise,
coupled with the allocation of the benefits attached to Israeli
citizenship only to Israel’s own nationals but not to West Bank
Palestinians, gives rise to flagrant discrimination that is tantamount
to “the de facto institutionalization of Apartheid of some sort,” 7
turning the occupation regime into one that “resembles a form of
colonial regime.”8
This Article examines whether the annexationist policies of
Israel in the West Bank have given rise, or will give rise in the near
future, to a right of West Bank Palestinians to Israeli citizenship.
This inquiry concerns mainly the vast majority of the Palestinian
population of the West Bank, residing in urban areas that are not
targeted by the settlement policy of Israel or by its plans of formal
annexation.
The scope of the obligation of a state to confer citizenship on
individuals is determined by international human rights law
(“IHRL”). 9 Insofar as existing and emerging norms of IHRL
recognize such an obligation, it is largely premised on a territorial
Under this division densely populated Palestinian areas were designated
Areas A and B and then handed over— . . . merely on paper—to the full
or partial control of the Palestinian Authority. These areas are noncontiguous, constituting 165 ‘islands’ scattered across the West Bank. The
rest of the land, constituting some 60% of the West Bank, was designated
Area C and remained under full Israeli control. Area C is contiguous and
includes all Israeli settlements . . . .
Conquer and Divide: The Shattering of Palestinian Space by Israel, B’TSELEM (2018),
https://conquer-and-divide.btselem.org/map-en.html [https://perma.cc/G5N9P7Q6]. Israeli settlement enclaves within Palestinian urban areas exist only in East
Jerusalem, which has been formally annexed by Israel, and in the Palestinian city of
Hebron.
See
Settlements,
B’TSELEM
(Jan.
16,
2019),
https://www.btselem.org/settlements [https://perma.cc/J6FX-FU4P].
6 See discussion of Israeli policies of integrating large parts of the West Bank
into Israel, infra Part IV.a.
7
Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation:
Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 551, 600 (2005); see
also John Dugard & John Reynolds, Apartheid, International Law, and the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 867, 912 (2013).
8
Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 586.
9
See discussion infra Part II.b.
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link between the state and the individual.10 The legal literature and
the U.N. International Law Commission (“ILC”) examined the
application of these norms to the residents of a territory acquired by
a state in the course of state succession. 11 Situations of state
succession include four modes of legal acquisition of territory,
namely “transfer of part of the territory, unification of States,
dissolution of a State and separation of part of the territory.”12
Yet, applying the norms of IHRL on citizenship to the
relationship between Israel and West Bank Palestinians, based on
the annexationist policies of Israel in the West Bank, is by no means
straightforward. The West Bank is a territory under Israeli
occupation.13 While situations of state succession concern the lawful
acquisition of territory by a state, the unilateral annexation by an
occupier of any part of the occupied territory violates international
law.14 Such annexation is deemed by international law to be null
and void,15 and attaching to it any legal effect would stand in tension
with this principle. Moreover, with the exception of East Jerusalem,
the annexationist policies of Israel have not taken the form of formal
annexation of West Bank territories, and such formal measure, if
pursued in the future, is likely to exclude those parts of the West
Bank populated by the bulk of the Palestinian population.16
The inquiry into whether, and to what extent, international law
supports a claim by West Bank Palestinians to Israeli citizenship is
threefold. First, this Article examines the scope of the obligation of
Israel under IHRL to grant citizenship to the residents of a territory
that is deemed by international law to have become part of Israel.
This Article shows that a plausible reading of the IHRL treaty
obligations of Israel in matters of citizenship suggests that Israel is
10
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-First Session, U.N. Doc.
A/54/10, at 29 (Apr. 3, 1999) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on Nationality],
https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_54_10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CKJ4-VWWH].
11 See id; see also discussion infra Part II.b.
12
ILC Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, at 23.
13 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 78 (July 9).
14
See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
15
S.C. Res. 478, ¶¶ 2-3 (Aug. 20, 1980); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 58-60 (2009).
16
See sources cited supra note 2.
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obligated to grant citizenship to individuals born in its territory,
who would otherwise be stateless. The Article further demonstrates
that most West Bank Palestinians are currently considered stateless.
Therefore, if a given area of the West Bank is considered to have
become part of Israel, most Palestinians subsequently born in such
territory are plausibly entitled to receive Israeli citizenship as a
matter of treaty law. In the case of legal annexation of territory by a
state, there also seems to be an emerging right under customary
international law of the residents of the annexed territory to receive
the citizenship of the annexing state, regardless of whether or not
such individuals would otherwise be considered stateless. The
Article concludes, however, that this emerging customary right is
yet to consolidate as lex lata.
Second, the Article examines whether the norms of IHRL on the
right to citizenship in the case of lawful annexation also extend to
the residents of territory that has been illegally annexed by Israel. In
other words, would the illegal annexation by Israel of the West Bank
make that territory a part of Israel for the purpose of the right to
citizenship?
The Article shows that international law has recognized a
limited human rights exception to the principle that an illegal
annexation is null and void. The interests underlying this principle
must, at times, be balanced against human rights, and the contours
of this balancing have been delineated by international
jurisprudence. Based on this jurisprudence, the Article concludes
that the norms of IHRL on the right to citizenship, which apply to
situations of state succession, extend to the case of illegal annexation
as well. In other words, an occupied territory unlawfully annexed
by the occupier may be viewed as part of the occupier’s territory for
the limited purpose of the right to citizenship. This conclusion
suffices to determine that the obligations of Israel under the norms
of IHRL on the right to citizenship apply, at the very least, to
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, a territory that has been
formally annexed by Israel.17
Third, the Article explores the concept of de facto annexation in
relation to the question of citizenship. Should parts of the West Bank
be considered, for the purpose of recognizing the right of Palestinian
residents of these territories to Israeli citizenship, a part of Israel
17

See discussion infra Part III.b.
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based on a doctrine that extends the concept of annexation beyond
formal annexation to encompass de facto annexation as well? The
Article answers this question in the affirmative, arguing that states
must not be allowed to evade their human rights obligations by
resorting to formal representations that do not reflect reality
regarding the status of a territory.
Commentators have pointed to “the doctrinal hole in the part of
international law governing annexation,” 18 which lacks “any
existing legal test for identifying an annexation where the matter is
unclear and in dispute.”19 The Article reviews the various possible
tests for the existence of de facto annexation proposed by
international jurisprudence and by the literature. For the purpose
of the right to citizenship, the Article advances the display of
sovereignty test for the existence of annexation, which brings
together formal annexation and de facto annexation. The test is
satisfied by the occupier’s continuous exercise in the occupied
territory of governmental functions that are typically reserved to a
sovereign. In other words, the occupier’s treatment of the occupied
territory as its own. The clearest form of such a display of
sovereignty is the full extension by the occupier of its legal and
administrative systems to the occupied territory, which is the
distinguishing mark of formal annexation. 20 Yet, the occupier’s
treatment of the occupied territory as its own, which satisfies the
display of sovereignty test for annexation, may also take the form of
the settlement by the occupier of its own population within the
occupied territory, large-scale infrastructure projects aimed at
supporting such settlement activity, and a partial extension of the
occupier’s own legal system to the occupied territory. Reviewing
the enterprise of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the legal
regime applied to it by Israel, the Article demonstrates that Israeli
displays of sovereignty in the West Bank amount to annexation.
What is the territorial scope of this annexation? The main
challenge in the application of the display of sovereignty test for
annexation concerns efforts on the part of the occupier to design the
18
Joshua Kleinfeld, Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether International
Law is Law, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2498 (2010); see also Omar M. Dajani, Israel’s
Creeping Annexation, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 51, 52 (2017-2018).
19
Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 2495.
20
See infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
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map of annexation in accordance with demographic considerations.
Israeli displays of sovereignty in the West Bank, manifest in the
settlement enterprise, typically target territories outside Palestinian
population centers,21 as do plans to formally annex parts of the West
Bank.22 Does the scope of annexation extend to population centers
within the occupied territory that are not the object of the occupier’s
annexationist policies, when the occupier aims to tailor its
annexation of occupied territory around, and to the exclusion of,
such population centers to advance a “maximum land, minimum
population” annexation formula?
The Article maintains that the principle of legality in
international law and the right to self-determination support an
argument against allowing an occupier to pick and choose densely
populated areas within the occupied territory that the occupier
would exclude from the realm of annexation and thereby from the
sway of the right to citizenship. Therefore, displays of sovereignty
by the occupier in large parts of the occupied territory, in the form
of formal annexation, settlement activity, or otherwise, may give rise
also to annexation of other areas of the occupied territory, which are
not targeted by the occupier’s annexationist policies. In view of the
current web of Israeli settlements across the West Bank, the
proposed test for annexation leads to the conclusion that unless
Israel removes, within a reasonable time, many of the settlements,
the entire territory of the West Bank will be considered to have been
annexed by Israel for the purpose of applying the norms of IHRL to
a claim by West Bank Palestinians to Israeli citizenship.
Some international lawyers rely on the notion of illegal
occupation as the preferred legal avenue for dismantling the type of
colonial regime established in the West Bank.23 Illegal occupation
gives rise to a duty of the occupier to withdraw from the occupied

See sources cited supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See Data on Netanyahu’s Jordan Valley Annexation Map, supra note 2.
23
See Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 605 (noting that the
actions of Israel in the West Bank “amount to a de facto annexation of large portions
of the occupied territory,” and that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank is
therefore illegal). Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michaeli caution that “[t]he law of
occupation may indeed pave the way for a kind of apartheid, but only to the extent
that it will be interpreted as excluding the notion of illegal occupation.” Id. at 611,
n. 327.
21
22
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territory immediately and unconditionally.24 International law has
long recognized the illegality of an occupation that was created by
an unlawful use of force by the occupier.25 An emerging approach
among commentators holds that an occupation resulting from a
lawful use of force by the occupier—in self-defense (“lawfully
created occupation”)—may also become illegal.26 Proponents of this
approach argue that the illegality of an occupation regime stems
from the unreasonable prolongation by the occupier of the
occupation. 27 Arguments that such conduct on the part of the
occupier renders the occupation illegal have largely focused on the
occupation of the West Bank by Israel, which, by most accounts,
resulted from the lawful use of force by Israel.28
The view that a lawfully created occupation may subsequently
become illegal is highly disputed in the literature29 and does not find
24

(2008).

Yael Ronen, Illegal Occupation and Its Consequences, 41 ISR. L. REV. 201, 228

25
See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, at 123 (Oct. 24, 1970) (“The territory of a State
shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in
contravention of the provisions of the [U.N.] Charter.”); see also Ariel Zemach, Can
Occupation Resulting from a War of Self-Defense Become Illegal?, 24 MINN. J. INT’L L.
313, 323-24 (2015).
26
Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 557; EYAL BENVENISTI, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 16-17 (2d ed. 2012); ANTONIO CASSESE, SELFDETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 55, 99 (1995); Ronen, supra note
24, at 210, 218.
27
BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 245-47; Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra
note 7, at 592-94, 597-605 (pointing to a “reasonable time” limit on the duration of
occupation).
28
See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 206-207
(2011); THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS
AND ARMED ATTACKS 104-05 (2002); CASSESE, supra note 26, at 131; GEOFFREY R.
WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
PEACE AGREEMENTS 30 (2000); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE:
BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 20-21 (1988); Michael P. Scharf, Clear and
Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban on Biological and Chemical Weapons
Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and Criminalization, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 477, 491-92
(1999).
29
See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 2 (“A . . . myth surrounding the legal
regime of belligerent occupation is that it is, or becomes in time, inherently illegal
under international law.”); Michael Curtis, International Law and the Territories, 32
HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 464-65 (1991) (“Israel is legally entitled to remain in the territory
it now holds and to protect its security interests therein until new boundaries are
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sufficient support in state practice.30 Moreover, the significance of
the illegality of occupation as a legal vehicle for facilitating the end
of occupation, and thereby the termination of an occupier’s
annexationist policies, is diminished once the factual integration of
the occupied territory into the occupying state is so deeply
entrenched that it cannot realistically be reversed. Indeed, the
purpose of an occupier’s annexationist policies is to create such
factual reality.
The notion of illegal occupation and a theory that links the
annexation of an occupied territory to a right of its residents to the
citizenship of the occupying state are competing ideas. The former
concerns the end of occupation, and as a corollary, the termination
of any formal or de facto annexation; the latter concerns the
enjoyment of the fruits of annexation by residents of the occupied
territory. Setting aside the controversy about whether or not a
lawfully created occupation may become illegal, this Article
explores the path in international law for recognizing a right of the
residents of an occupied territory to the citizenship of the occupying
state on the basis of annexation.
Part II of this Article discusses the significance of the right to
citizenship. Unless otherwise indicated, the terms “citizenship” and
“nationality” are used throughout the Article synonymously.31 Part
II also elaborates on the scope of the obligations of Israel, under
existing and emerging norms of IHRL, to grant citizenship to
individuals residing in its territory, particularly following the
acquisition of territory by Israel. Part III shows that such obligations
extend to Palestinians residing in occupied territories illegally
drawn in a peace settlement.”); Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of International Law in the
Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1970) (“[T]here is
nothing in either the [U.N.] Charter or general international law which leads one to
suppose that military occupation, pending a peace treaty, is illegal.”); see generally
Zemach, supra note 25, at 313 (arguing that the notion of illegal occupation in
international law does not extend to occupation resulting from the lawful use of
force by a state in self-defense).
30
Zemach, supra note 25, at 326-334 (demonstrating that international practice
does not sufficiently support the existence of a rule of customary international law
providing that a prolonged occupation resulting from a lawful use of force may
become illegal).
31
Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 694,
717 (2011) (noting that many commentators consider “nationality” and
“citizenship” interchangeable).
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annexed by Israel. Part IV reviews Israeli policies of integrating
parts of the occupied West Bank into Israel, which so far have not
taken the form of formal annexation. Part IV argues that, for the
purpose of applying the norms of IHRL concerning the right to
citizenship, the definition of annexation extends beyond formal
annexation and encompasses de facto annexation. Part IV identifies
the appropriate test for the existence of annexation and applies it to
the occupied West Bank.
II. THE RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
a. The Significance of Citizenship
The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) described nationality
as a “legal bond” between an individual and a particular state. 32
Commentators have identified two core consequences of nationality
under customary international law. First, a state has a discretionary
right, but not an obligation, to provide diplomatic protection to its
nationals, that is, “to intervene on behalf of its own nationals if their
rights are violated by another state for the purpose of obtaining
redress.” 33 Second, a state has a duty to admit and readmit its
nationals into its territory and allow them to reside therein.34
Alice Edwards observed that beyond diplomatic protection and
the duty of states to admit their citizens, “there is no agreed
substantive minimum content of nationality as a matter of
international law, not least because it turns so heavily on conditions
and rules in the state of nationality.”35 According to Edwards, the
right to nationality in international law is primarily a “procedural
right, covering rights and rules relating to nationality acquisition
Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6).
Alice Edwards, The Meaning of Nationality in International Law in an Era of
Human Rights: Procedural and Substantive Aspects, in NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 30-31 (Alice Edwards & Laura Van Waas eds., 2014);
see also P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-44 (2d
ed. 1979) (discussing the right of states to provide diplomatic protection to their
nationals).
34
Edwards, supra note 33, at 30, 35-38; WEIS, supra note 33, at 45-49.
35
Edwards, supra note 33, at 42.
32
33
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and deprivation,”36 whereas “the substantive content of ‘citizenship’
will depend to a large extent on one’s country of citizenship.”37
Edwards’s observation may be accurate with respect to
customary international law. Yet, treaty law that is binding on Israel
entitles citizens, but not others, to the most important aspects of
political participation. Article 25 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) provides that every citizen has
the right to “take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives[,]” vote in elections for the
governing institutions of the state, and stand for election to such
institutions.38 This provision also entitles citizens to have access to
public service. 39 Article 25 stipulates that these rights must be
secured for all citizens without “unreasonable restrictions” or
discrimination based on any status.40
The substantive significance of citizenship in international law
also stems from the general human rights law principle of nondiscrimination, enshrined in numerous human rights instruments41
and considered a norm of customary international law.42 As stated,
among others, in Article 26 of the ICCPR, this norm provides that:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,

Id. at 16 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 14.
38
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
39 Id. at 179.
40 Id.; see also id. at 173-74 (prohibiting discrimination based on any status in
the application of the rights recognized in the ICCPR).
41 See, e.g., European Convention on Nationality art. 5(2), Nov. 6, 1997, 37
I.L.M. 44.; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 211; ICCPR, supra note 38, 999 U.N.T.S.
at 179; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2 (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
42
See Steven D. Jamar, The International Human Right to Health, 22 S.U. L. REV.
1, 25 (1994) (“The right of non-discrimination and the right of equality are so well
enshrined in all human rights conventions as to be an indisputable part of
customary international human rights law.”).
36
37
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sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.43
Applied to citizenship status, the principle of nondiscrimination entails that “[a]s a citizen/national, an individual is
recognized as a full member of the state, with all its attendant rights
and obligations to be enjoyed in full equality and without
discrimination.”44 T.H. Marshall described citizenship as “a status
bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who
possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with
which the status is endowed.”45
The relationship between citizenship and the principle of nondiscrimination, therefore, makes the former “the threshold through
which individuals gain rights.”46 Chief Justice Warren’s description
of citizenship as the “right to have rights”47 is only partially accurate
when it comes to international human rights law, as there are
fundamental human rights that a state must secure for individuals
within its jurisdiction regardless of citizenship.48 There is, however,
a bundle of rights that, under international human rights law, flow
from citizenship by virtue of the principle of non-discrimination, in
that if the state grants them to some of its citizens it must extend
them to all its citizens. Hence, in addition to political rights and the
rights of entry and residence, citizenship status may bear on a range
of social and economic rights, including the right to own property,
the right to work, and the right to receive economic benefits afforded
by the government only to citizens.49
ICCPR, supra note 38, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
Edwards, supra note 33, at 38.
45
T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS
3, 18 (T.H. Marshall & Tom Bottomore eds., 1992).
46
David M. Howard, Analyzing the Causes of Statelessness in Syrian Refugee
Children, 52 TEX. INT’L L. J. 281, 286 (2017).
47
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958).
48
See Edwards, supra note 33, at 40 (“[W]hile international human rights law
articulates the basic rights all persons are entitled to enjoy, regardless of their
nationality, there are still some key rights linked to nationality.”).
49
See Edwards, supra note 33, at 40 (noting that “rights to economic, social and
cultural advancement” are generally associated with citizenship); Carol A.
Batchelor, Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status, 10 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 156, 159 (1998) (“Failure to acquire status under the law can have a
negative impact on many important elements of life, including the right to vote, to
43
44
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b. The Right to Acquire Citizenship
i.

Traditional International Law

The traditional approach followed by international law in
matters of nationality, stated in Oppenheim’s International Law,
held that “it is not for international law but for the internal law of
each state to determine who is, and who is not, to be considered its
national.” 50 This view was affirmed by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in its advisory opinion concerning the Tunis
and Morocco Nationality Decrees, which noted that “in the present
state of international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion
of the Court, in principle within this reserved domain [of state
discretion].”51 This approach also prevailed with regard to the legal
consequences of state succession.52
The deference of traditional international law to state discretion
in matters of citizenship has not been absolute. The existence of
modest international restraints on the liberty of states in this sphere
was indicated in Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws 53 (“1930 Hague
Convention”). The Convention reaffirmed the traditional view that
“[i]t is for each State to determine under its own law who are its
nationals,”54 but proceeded to stipulate that nationality laws enacted
by a state “shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is
consistent with international conventions, international custom, and
own property, to have health care, to send one’s children to school, to work, and to
travel to and from one’s country of residence.”); Howard, supra note 46, at 286.
50
1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 852 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 2008).
51
Second (Extraordinary) Session, Advisory Opinion No. 4, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) 7, 24 (Feb. 7).
52
See Jeffrey L. Blackman, State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging
Right to an Effective Nationality under International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1141, 1152
(1998) (“In the context of state succession, the traditional view holds that the
nationality of individuals affected by a change in sovereignty must be determined
by the domestic law of the states concerned.”).
53
See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws art. 1, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Convention on
Nationality].
54 Id. art. 1.
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the principles of law generally recognized with regard to
nationality.”55 It was thus observed that the 1930 Hague Convention
“simultaneously asserts the principle of state discretion over
nationality questions and the principle of international limitations
on state discretion—without specifying what those limitations
might be.”56
It seems, however, that prior to the development of international
human rights law, customary international law imposed only
negative limitations on state discretion in matters of citizenship.
These limitations provided that a state cannot claim that its
conferring of citizenship on an individual is entitled to recognition
by other states in the absence of sufficient factual ties between that
state and the individual concerned.57 International law restraints on
state discretion in matters of citizenship did not take the form of
positive citizenship rights that individuals possess with respect to a
particular state.58

Id.
Blackman, supra note 52, at 1154.
57
Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, 22-26 (Apr. 6). This
case involved a claim for damages filed by Liechtenstein against Guatemala on
behalf of Nottebohm, a resident of Guatemala who was granted citizenship by
Liechtenstein. The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) held that Guatemala was
under no obligation to recognize the citizenship granted by Liechtenstein to
Nottebohm, and that Liechtenstein, therefore, was not entitled to exercise
diplomatic protection in respect of Nottebohm. The Court reasoned that the
granting of citizenship did not reflect real and effective ties between Liechtenstein
and Nottebohm, and that a state’s policy with regard to the granting of citizenship
merits recognition by other states only if “it has acted in conformity with [the]
general aim of making the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual’s
genuine connection with the State.” Id. See also Spiro, supra note 31, at 705
(“Nottebohm was merely an extension of the accepted rule that states could not
reach out to claim those to whom they had no real connection.”); Blackman, supra
note 52, at 1158 (“In relation to nationality law, then, the international limitations
on state discretion affirmed in Nottebohm remained negative in character, taking the
form of non-recognition by other international subjects.”).
58
See Spiro, supra note 31, at 698 (“The early law of nationality was bounded
by the interests of states vis-a-vis each other, not the interests of individuals.”);
Blackman, supra note 52, at 1158 (noting that in Nottebohm “the Court [did not] assert
any dramatic positive rights of individuals with respect to nationality claims viz.
states.”).
55
56
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ii. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International
Human Rights Treaties
The right to a nationality was introduced into the sphere of
international law in 1948 by Article 15 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (“UDHR”), which provided that:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his nationality.59
The positive character of Article 15 has been disputed in the
literature. It has been argued that “the article’s vagueness has
robbed it of any immediate force. Most significantly, Article 15 does
not carry a specific corresponding obligation on states to confer
nationality. In other words, the article fails to indicate precisely to
which nationality one has the right and under what circumstances
that right arises.”60
The ICCPR, an instrument intended to give legal effect to the
UDHR, does not include any reference to a general right to
nationality. Commentators reviewing the drafting history of the
ICCPR have attributed this omission to the complexity of
developing rules for the realization of the general principle stated in
the UDHR.61 Article 24(3) of the ICCPR, which concerns the rights
of children, states that “[e]very child has the right to acquire a
nationality.”62 The right of children to acquire a nationality was also
recognized by Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(“Child Convention”), which stipulates:

UDHR, supra note 41, art. 15(1)-(2).
Blackman, supra note 52, at 1172 (internal italics omitted); see also Edwards,
supra note 33, at 14 (“No corresponding obligation on states to grant nationality was
elaborated in the UDHR.”).
61 See, e.g., Johannes M.M. Chan, The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right, 12
HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1991).
62
ICCPR, supra note 38, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179. Similarly, according to principle
3 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly, “[t]he child shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a nationality.”
G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Prin. 3 (Dec. 10, 1959).
59
60
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1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have the right from birth to a name, [and] the right to
acquire a nationality . . .
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these
rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in
this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.63
These instruments do not explicitly identify which state bears
the corresponding obligation to grant citizenship.64
Article 2(1) of the Child Convention, however, requires states to
respect and ensure the rights enunciated in the Convention “to each
child within their jurisdiction without discrimination.”65 Based on a
joint reading of Article 7 and Article 2(1) of the Child Convention,
the ILC construed this instrument to require that “unless the child
acquires the nationality of another State, he or she has, in the last
instance, the right to the nationality of the State on the territory of
which he or she was born.“66 A similar construction may be applied
to Article 24(3) of the ICCPR, in view of Article 2(1) of the ICCPR,
which requires states to respect and ensure the rights enunciated in
this instrument “to all individuals within [their] territory and subject
to [their] jurisdiction.”67
This construction of Article 24(3) of the ICCPR and of Article 7
of the Child Convention is not shared by everyone, however. In its
General Comment No. 17, which addressed the construction of
Article 24 of the ICCPR, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (“UNHRC”) did not identify which state bears the
obligation to grant a child citizenship to prevent statelessness or

63
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Child Convention].
64
See Gerard-René de Groot, Children, Their Right to a Nationality and Child
Statelessness, in NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 144,
146 (Alice Edwards & Laura Van Waas eds., 2014) (“Neither the ICCPR nor the CRC
[Child Convention] indicate which nationality a child may have a right to . . . .”).
65
Child Convention, supra note 63, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 46.
66
ILC Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, at 36, cmt. 2.
67
ICCPR, supra note 38, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
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otherwise. 68 Jeffrey Blackman argued that Article 24(3) of the
ICCPR, granting children a right to nationality, “is undermined by
the failure to specify upon whom a corresponding obligation to
grant nationality falls,” 69 in the same way that Article 15 of the
UDHR is undermined by its own vagueness. This view seems to
pertain to Article 7 of the Child Convention, as well.
Article 1(1) of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness states that “[a] Contracting State shall grant its
nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be
stateless.”70 “Statelessness is . . . the legal condition of being without
a nationality.”71 The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
provides the clarity that is absent from the ICCPR and Child
Convention, by explicitly identifying the state in which a stateless
person was born as the bearer of the obligation to grant citizenship.
Israel is party to the ICCPR and to the Child Convention. 72
Hence, under human rights treaty law, Israel arguably has an
68
United Nations Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 17: Rights of the
Child (Article 24), sec. 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (Apr. 7, 1989).
69
Blackman, supra note 52, at 1172.
70
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 1(1), Aug. 30, 1961, 989
U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter Statelessness Convention]. The Convention allows a state
to determine whether nationality is granted “(a) at birth, by operation of law, or (b)
upon an application being lodged with the appropriate authority.” Id. See also id.
art. 1(2) (A state that opts for the grant of nationality upon an application must
allow the person concerned to submit such application within the period between
her eighteenth birthday and her twenty-first birthday, and may require, as
conditions for the grant of its nationality: (a) “that the person concerned has
habitually resided in the territory of the State for such period as may be fixed by
that State, not exceeding five years immediately preceding the lodging of the
application nor ten years in all;” (b) “that the person concerned has neither been
convicted of an offence against national security nor has been sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of five years or more on a criminal charge;” and (c) “that
the person concerned has always been stateless.”).
71
Blackman, supra note 52, at 1176; see also Convention Relating to the Status
of Stateless Persons art. 1, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (“The term ‘stateless
person’ means a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the
operation of its law.”).
72
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Status of Treaties, Depositary, UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_n
o=IV-4&src=IND [https://perma.cc/R8X8-BKKR]; Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Status of Treaties, Depositary, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&cha
pter=4&lang=en [https://perma.cc/B69Z-UAMJ].
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obligation to grant citizenship to children, born in its territory, who
would otherwise remain stateless. Even this limited obligation is
contingent upon a reading of the ICCPR and of the Child
Convention that is not shared by everyone. Israel is not a party to
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 73 nor to any
regional human rights treaty that recognizes a right to nationality.74
The norm of non-discrimination, enshrined in IHRL treaty
provisions, also bears on the obligations of Israel to grant
citizenship.75 Article 26 of the ICCPR prohibits the discriminatory
treatment of individuals based on race, religion, or national origin,
among other things. 76 Although the ICCPR does not stipulate a
general right to citizenship, “[o]n the face of Article 26, the
provisions for equality and non-discrimination are not confined in
application to the rights set forth in the Covenant,”77 and therefore
apply to the granting of citizenship, as well. The International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, to which Israel is a party, also guarantees the right
of everyone, without distinction as to race, color, or national or
ethnic origin, to equality before the law in the enjoyment of the right
to nationality.78
73
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Status of Treaties, Depositary,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (indicating that Israel has signed the
Convention
but
has
not
ratified
it),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-4&c
hapter=5&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/7C6K-G8E8].
74
See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights art. 20(2), Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (“Every person has the right to the nationality
of the state in whose territory he was born if he does not have the right to any other
nationality.”); see also European Convention on Nationality, supra note 41, arts. 4, 6
(affirming the principles that “everyone has the right to a nationality” and that
“statelessness shall be avoided,” and stipulating the rules on nationality that derive
from these principles).
75
See Spiro, supra note 31, at 721 (“[I]n the context of both state succession
and migration, antidiscrimination norms supply an important baseline.”); see also
Edwards, supra note 33, at 26 (“[N]on-discrimination in nationality laws is a
general principle of international law underpinned by many international
conventions.”).
76
ICCPR, supra note 38, 999 U.N.T.S. 179; see also supra text accompanying
note 43.
77
See Blackman, supra note 52, at 1184.
78
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, supra note 41, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220; see also International Convention
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The Citizenship Law enacted by Israel allows a path to
citizenship based on habitual residence, requiring, among other
conditions, that individuals lawfully reside in Israel for three of the
five years preceding the application for citizenship.79 In view of the
principle of non-discrimination, in granting citizenship based on
habitual residence, Israel must not discriminate against Palestinian
residents of West Bank territories that are deemed a part of Israel.
To the extent that a large number of West Bank Palestinians are
considered to be its residents, Israel may choose, however, to repeal
the habitual residence path to citizenship altogether. Importantly,
the Israeli Law of Return entitles Jews and their descendants, but not
others, to acquire Israeli citizenship without establishing habitual
residence in Israel before applying for citizenship.80 The question of
whether the ethnically-based discrimination manifest in the Law of
Return can be justified, in view of the harsh history of the Jewish
people, as an affirmative action exception to the norm of nondiscrimination, was debated extensively in legal literature.81
iii. Customary International Law
In view of the limited and disputed nature of the treaty law
obligations of Israel in matters of nationality, it is important to
examine whether the annexation of territory by a state gives rise to
a broader and clearer obligation of that state under customary
international law to confer citizenship upon the residents of the
annexed territory. This question was discussed in the legal literature
as well as by the ILC in relation to state succession.
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Status of Treaties, Depositary,
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
UNITED
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&
chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/636V-HC6B].
79 See § 5(a), Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 50 (1951-52), as amended (Isr.).
80
Law of Return, 5710-1950, LSI 4 114 (1950), as amended (Isr.); see also
Jonathan Zasloff, Left and Right in the Middle East: Notes on the Social Construction of
Race, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 207 (2006) (“Israel’s ‘Law of Return,’ enacted just a few
months after the founding of the state, explicitly grants automatic citizenship to
anyone deemed Jewish under the criteria set forth in the law.”).
81
For a review of this debate, see, e.g., Zasloff, supra note 80, at 207-210; Yehiel
S. Kaplan, Immigration Policy of Israel: The Unique Perspective of a Jewish State, 31
TOURO L. REV. 1089, 1092-98, 1134 (2015).
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According to Ian Brownlie, a state that gained territory through
change of sovereignty is required to grant citizenship to the
residents of such territory.82 Brownlie observed that state practice
in situations of succession of states, examined as evidence of
customary international law, “is overwhelmingly in support of the
view that the population follows the change of sovereignty in
matters of nationality.”83 This view finds support in the position
adopted by international organizations involved in recent state
successions.84
A similar position has been taken by the ILC in its Draft Articles
on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of
States85 (“Draft Articles”). Article 1 of the Draft Articles stipulates
that “[e]very individual who, on the date of the succession of States,
had the nationality of the predecessor State, irrespective of the mode
of acquisition of that nationality, has the right to the nationality of at
least one of the States concerned, in accordance with the present
draft articles.” 86 The ILC noted that Article 1 is based on the
principle, enshrined in Article 15 of the UDHR, according to which
everyone has the right to a nationality, although it acknowledged
that “the positive character of article 15 has been disputed in the
doctrine.”87
In assigning the obligation corresponding to the right to
nationality, the ILC resorted to the concept of “effective nationality,”
82
Ian Brownlie, The Relations of Nationality in Public International Law, 39 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 284, 320-26 (1963).
83 Id. at 320.
84
See, e.g., ORG. FOR SEC. & COOP. IN EUR., THE OTTAWA DECLARATION OF THE
OSCE
PARLIAMENTARY
ASSEMBLY
¶
34
(July
4-8,
1950),
https://www.osce.org/pa/38133?download=true
[https://perma.cc/4M88GADM] (“The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, . . . [u]rges that, upon a change in
sovereignty, all persons who have a genuine and effective link with a new State
should acquire the citizenship of that State.”); EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR
DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW, VENICE COMMISSION DECLARATION ON THE
CONSEQUENCES OF STATE SUCCESSION FOR THE NATIONALITY OF NATURAL PERSONS art.
8 (Sept. 13-14, 1996), https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/7960
[https://perma.cc/W6SS-8C8E] (“In all cases of State succession, the successor
State shall grant its nationality to all nationals of the predecessor State residing
permanently on the transferred territory.”); European Convention on Nationality,
supra note 41, art. 18(2).
85
ILC Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10.
86 Id. at 25, art. 1.
87 Id. at 25, cmt. 1-2.
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which focuses on a territorial nexus between the state and the
individual, in the form of habitual residence.88 The ILC reasoned
that “[h]abitual residence is the test that has most often been used in
[state] practice for defining the basic body of nationals of the
successor State, even if it was not the only one.”89 The ILC adhered
to the view that “the juridical relationship of nationality should not
be based on formality or artifice, but on a real connection between
the individual and the State.” 90 Article 20 of the Draft Articles
therefore concludes that “[w]hen part of the territory of a State is
transferred by that State to another State, the successor State shall
attribute its nationality to the persons concerned who have their
habitual residence in the transferred territory and the predecessor
State shall withdraw its nationality from such persons,” unless the
individuals concerned opt to retain the nationality of the
predecessor state. 91 Similarly, Article 21 of the Draft Articles
stipulates that when two or more States unite to form one successor
state “the successor State shall attribute its nationality to all persons
who, on the date of the succession of States, had the nationality of a
predecessor State.”92 Moreover, based on the ILC’s interpretation of
the Child Convention regarding the right of a child to nationality,
Article 13 of the Draft Articles states that “[a] child . . . born after the
date of the succession of States, who has not acquired any
nationality, has the right to the nationality of the State concerned on
whose territory that child was born.”93
The bulk of authority in the legal literature, however, does not
support the view that the principles laid out by the ILC have
consolidated the status of customary international law. D.P.
O’Connell concluded that “[u]ndesirable as it may be that any
persons become stateless as a result of a change of sovereignty, it
cannot be asserted with any measure of confidence that
88 Id. at 29, cmt. 4; see also Václav Mikulka (Special Rapporteur), Third Report
on Nationality in Relation to the Succession of States, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/480 (Feb. 2728, 1997) (“The identification of the rules governing the distribution of individuals
among the States involved in a succession derives in large part from the application
of the principle of effective nationality to a specific case of State succession.”).
89
ILC Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, at 29, cmt. 4.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 41, art. 20.
92 Id. at 41-2, art. 21.
93 Id. at 35, art. 13.
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international law, at least in its present stage of development,
imposes any duty on the successor State to grant nationality.” 94
Similarly, Paul Weis concluded based on an extensive review of state
practice:
[T]here is no rule of international law under which the
nationals of the predecessor State acquire the nationality of
the successor State. International law cannot have such a
direct effect, and the practice of States does not bear out the
contention that this is inevitably the result of the change of
sovereignty.95
Acknowledging that “the overwhelming weight of state practice
has been for a successor state to confer nationality on the nationals
of the predecessor state domiciled on the territory concerned,” 96
Jeffrey Blackman nevertheless maintained that such state practice
“lacks the essential element under international law of opinio
juris . . . no evidence demonstrates that states have conferred
nationality in compliance with perceived international legal
obligations to that effect.”97 Blackman concluded that “the right to
nationality is probably not part of customary international law,
given the few international instruments which mention the right
and the absence of uniform state practice and opinio juris.”98 Recent
literature seems to confirm this view.99
94
1 D.P. O’CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 503 (1967).
95
WEIS, supra note 33, at 143-44 (“As a rule, however, States have conferred
their nationality on the former nationals of the predecessor State, and in this regard
one may say that there is, in the absence of statutory provisions of municipal law,
a presumption of international law that municipal law has this effect.”).
96
Blackman, supra note 52, at 1163.
97 Id. In this regard, Blackman noted that the deliberations of the International
Law Commission [hereinafter ILC] concerning the Draft Articles do not
demonstrate a general agreement that the Draft Articles reflect lex lata. See id. at
1165; see also Václav Mikulka, Second Rep. on State Succession and Its Impact on the
Nationality of Natural and Legal Persons, at 129, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/474 (1996) (“[T]he
comments of delegations [in the course of ILC discussions] were inconclusive as to
the existence of an international obligation binding upon the successor State
regarding the granting of its nationality following State succession.”).
98
Blackman, supra note 52, at 1176.
99
Spiro, supra note 31, at 695-96 (“It is still not possible, however, to speak
generally of a ‘right to citizenship’ (at least not one enforceable on particular states),
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Based on the ILC Draft Articles, the approach taken by
international organizations and international treaties, Blackman
recognized, however, that “the clear trend in international law is
toward the imposition of positive obligations on states [with regard
to the granting of citizenship] deriving from the principle of effective
nationality . . . at least in the context of state successions.” 100
Although the status of the right to nationality as lex lata is yet to
consolidate, Blackman and others consider it to be “an emerging
right” 101 that, upon state succession, will entitle individuals to
nationality “in that state with which an individual possesses
genuine and effective links.”102 Similarly, there are divergent views
in the literature on whether the right of children, who would
otherwise be stateless, to acquire the nationality of their state of birth
has already been consolidated in customary international law or
whether it is considered an emerging right.103

and it remains difficult even to speak of a right to citizenship in particular cases.
The trend in practice is not a concerted or broadly conscious one and would not
satisfy traditional doctrinal standards for establishing customary law.”); Ineta
Ziemele, State Succession and Issues of Nationality and Statelessness, in NATIONALITY
AND STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 217, 245 (Alice Edwards & Laura
Van Waas eds., 2014) (“The fact remains that despite multiple reaffirmations of the
right to nationality as a human right in different international law and human rights
texts, the right to a specific nationality has not evolved.”); Id. at 243 (“[I]t is difficult
to say that there is a clear obligation as a matter of customary international law to
avoid statelessness in each and every case.”).
100
Blackman, supra note 52, at 1170.
101 Id. at 1192; see also Spiro, supra note 31, at 720-21 (“[An emerging norm of
IHRL] holds that habitual residents and their progeny should not be relegated to
noncitizen status indefinitely and that at some point in time, territorial presence
should give rise to baseline eligibility for citizenship acquisition.”). Spiro further
notes that state practice supports this norm “[i]n the context of state succession
perhaps more than any other.” Id. at 721.
102
Blackman, supra note 52, at 1192.
103
Ziemele, supra note 99, at 243 (“[E]xceptionally in relation to children, the
obligation not to render them stateless combined with the acknowledged right to
acquire nationality at birth can be considered as having achieved the necessary
opinion juris under customary international law and most likely applies irrespective
of the lawful or unlawful context of territorial change.”). But see Edwards, supra
note 33, at 29 (“[T]he duty to prevent statelessness, at least in respect of children, is
emerging as a norm of customary international law.” (emphasis added)); de Groot,
supra note 64, at 148 (“[W]ithin the realm of human rights law, there is broad
recognition of the child’s right to acquire a nationality,” but there is “limited
guidance on how the right is to be exercised.”).
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c. The Right to Citizenship and the Acquisition of Territory: Tuaua v.
United States
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
recently addressed a claim to citizenship rights emanating from the
acquisition by the United States of the territory of American Samoa,
a portion of a South Pacific archipelago that came under U.S.
sovereignty in the early 20th Century.104 American Samoa has not
been incorporated into the United States federal system. The
territory is partially self-governed by a democratically elected
government, but remains under the ultimate supervision of the U.S.
Secretary of the Interior.105 The Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, 106 passed by the U.S. Congress, designates persons born in
American Samoa as “non-citizen nationals” of the United States.107
In Tuaua v. United States, the Appellants, individuals born in
American Samoa, claimed that they were entitled to U.S. citizenship
by birthright, based on the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,108 which provides that “[a]ll
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.”109
Having concluded that “the Citizenship Clause is textually
ambiguous as to whether ‘in the United States’ encompasses
America’s unincorporated territories,”110 the Court resorted to the
doctrine laid out in the Insular Cases, a series of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that examined the reach of the Constitution in territories
possessed by the United States that are not a part of the federal
system of states. 111
This doctrine distinguishes between
incorporated territories, which are designated for statehood from
the time of acquisition, and unincorporated territories (such as
Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
See id.
106
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat.
163 (1952).
107 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 302; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1).
108 Tuaua, 788 F.3d. at 302.
109
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
110 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 302.
111
See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75, 77 (1957).
104
105
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American Samoa), which are not designated for statehood. Whereas
the Constitution applies with full force to the former, 112 the
application of any particular constitutional protection to
unincorporated territories depends on a case-by-case determination
that the extension of the right to a particular unincorporated
territory would not be “impractical and anomalous.” 113 Such a
determination must be made “in view of the particular
circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives
which Congress had before it.”114 The reasoning in Tuaua therefore
focused on examining “whether the circumstances are such that
recognition of the right to birthright citizenship would prove
‘impracticable and anomalous,’ as applied to contemporary
American Samoa.” 115 The Court answered this question in the
affirmative, and therefore concluded that the Citizenship Clause
does not extend a right to U.S. citizenship to those born in American
Samoa.116
The Court grounded its decision in the principles of democracy
and self-determination. The democratically elected government of
American Samoa joined the United States in opposing the
appellants’ claim to a constitutional birthright to citizenship. 117
Speaking for the majority of its constituency, the government of
American Samoa expressed concerns that the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to American Samoa
could undermine “social structures inherent to the traditional
Samoan way of life,” 118 for example, “by imperiling American
Samoa’s traditional, racially-based land alienation rules.” 119 The
Court considered it “anomalous to impose citizenship over the
objections of the American Samoan people themselves, as expressed
through their democratically elected representatives.”120 Citing the

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 306.
Reid, 354 U.S at 75.
Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 309 (citing Reid, 354 U.S at 75).
Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 309.
Id. at 302, 310.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
Id.
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right of peoples to self-determination, enshrined in the United
Nations Charter,121 the Court elaborated:
We can envision little that is more anomalous, under modern
standards, than the forcible imposition of citizenship against
the majoritarian will . . . . To hold the contrary would be to
mandate an irregular intrusion into the autonomy of Samoan
democratic decision-making; an exercise of paternalism—if
not overt cultural imperialism—offensive to the shared
democratic traditions of the United States and modern
American Samoa.122
The reasoning of the Court did not address the right to
citizenship in international human rights law, either in the
interpretation of the constitutional Citizenship Clause or as an
independent legal principle, outside the scope of the Citizenship
Clause. This may be reasonably explained by the Court adhering to
the position pronounced by a U.S. District Court judge six decades
earlier, which holds that “citizenship depends . . . entirely on
municipal law and is not regulated by international law.
Acquisition of citizenship of the United States is governed solely by
the Constitution and by acts of Congress.”123 Yet Tuaua has limited
weight in assessing the state of IHRL on the right to citizenship, as
the unique circumstances of the case stray far from the typical
situations of acquisition of territory by a state envisioned in the ILC
Draft Articles.
American Samoa, which maintains a high degree of autonomy,
is governed by a democratically elected legislature and governor.124
This allows American Samoans to enjoy, in American Samoa, the
U.N. Charter arts. 1, 73; Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 311.
Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 311-12.
123 Tomasicchio v. Acheson, 98 F.Supp. 166, 169 (D.D.C. 1951).
124
For the extent of autonomy exercised by American Samoa, see, e.g., Office
of Insular Affairs, American Samoa, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/american-samoa
[https://perma.cc/YF6KSEM9] (“The Immigration and Naturalization Service of the U.S. Department of
Justice does not exercise jurisdiction in American Samoa. No one may enter
American Samoa unless he or she complies with certain entry requirements of the
American Samoa Government.”). Moreover, American Samoa has its own land
ownership laws, which are not subject to the requirements of the U.S. Constitution.
See Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 309-312; see also id. at 302 (noting the democratic nature of the
government of American Samoa).
121
122
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rights typically associated with citizenship, including the right to
democratic participation. According to the elected representatives
of the people of American Samoa, the legal regime that applies to
the territory is preferred by the majority of American Samoans.125
American Samoans are entitled to U.S. passports126 and presumably
treated by the U.S. government not differently from U.S. citizens
when it comes to diplomatic protection. American Samoans,
therefore, appear to enjoy the equivalent of citizenship in a
democratic state, although they do not enjoy all the particular
benefits of U.S. citizenship, dubbed by the U.S. Supreme Court “one
of the most valuable rights in the world today.”127
The arguments of democracy and self-determination against the
granting of citizenship, which emanate from the special, highly
autonomous status of American Samoa, are unavailable in typical
situations of state succession, where the transferred territory is fully
integrated into the successor state. The self-determination argument
invoked by the Court against the granting of citizenship to
American Samoans would ring particularly hollow when it comes
to the reality of de facto annexation by an occupier of the occupied
territory, which suppresses the exercise of the right to selfdetermination by the local population.
d. Are West Bank Palestinians Stateless?
To the extent that treaty provisions that are binding on Israel in
matters of nationality, namely, Article 24(3) of the ICCPR and Article
7 of the Child Convention, require Israel to grant citizenship to
individuals born in territory it has annexed, such requirement is
confined to those who would otherwise be stateless.128 It seems that

Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 309-12.
Joseph E. Sung, Redressing the Legal Stigmatization of American Samoans, 89
S. CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2016).
127 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
128
See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
125
126
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most West Bank Palestinians are considered stateless for the
purpose of the application of IHRL in matters of nationality.129
In 1950, during the period of Jordanian occupation of the West
Bank, Jordan declared the annexation of the West Bank.130 Shortly
after the annexation, which was considered illegal and void by the
bulk of the international community, 131 Jordan granted Jordanian
citizenship to the residents of the West Bank, pursuant to the
Jordanian Nationality Law of 1954. 132 In 1988, however, two
decades after the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the West
Bank, Jordan terminated its annexation of the West Bank, renounced
its sovereignty claim to this territory, and divested the residents of
the West Bank of their Jordanian citizenship.133 This last measure
was undertaken in the form of government instructions, which
stipulated that “every person residing in the West Bank prior to
31.7.1988 is a Palestinian and not a Jordanian citizen.”134 Although
some commentators have questioned whether the divestiture of
West Bank Palestinians of their Jordanian citizenship was valid
under Jordanian domestic law,135 such validity was recognized by
the High Court of Justice in Jordan, which considered the

129
Yousef T. Jabareen, The Politics of Equality: The Limits of Collective Rights
Litigation and the Case of the Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 4 COLUM. J. RACE & L.
23, 30 n. 28 (2013) (“The majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza hold
no citizenship in any country . . . . The vast majority of Palestinians in the occupied
Palestinian territories are stateless . . . .”).
130
Lewis Saideman, Do Palestinian Refugees Have a Right of Return to Israel? An
Examination of the Scope of and Limitations on the Right of Return, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 829,
868-69 (2004); BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 204.
131 BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 204 (observing with regard to the annexation
by Jordan of the West Bank, “[t]his purported annexation . . . was, however, widely
regarded, including by the Arab League, as illegal and void, and was recognized
only by Britain, Iraq, and Pakistan”).
132
Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality, art. 3(2) (Jordan), Al-Jaridah alRasmiyyah
lil-Mamlakah
al-Urduniyyah
al-Hasimiyyah,
No.
1171,
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ea13.html
[https://perma.cc/H5694VYJ]; Saideman, supra note 130, at 869.
133
John Quigley, The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are they Treaties?, 30
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 717, 728 (1997); Al Kour v. Minister of Interior, Jordanian High
Court of Justice, 39 JORDANIAN BAR ASS’N, 1040 (1991), translated in 6 PALESTINE Y.B.
INT’L L. 68 (1990-1991).
134
Al Kour, 6 PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L L. at 70 (citing the instructions issued by
the Jordanian government).
135
E.g., Saideman, supra note 130, at 873-74.
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instructions issued by the government as “acts of the State acting as
a sovereign.”136
The debate on whether or not a Palestinian state exists and holds
title to the territory of the West Bank137 does not seem to bear on the
status of the Palestinians as stateless, as far as IHRL is concerned.
To the extent that a Palestinian state exists, the citizenship it extends
to West Bank Palestinians is largely void of substance, because
under Israeli occupation such a state has never had the capacity to
offer Palestinians the benefits typically associated with
citizenship.138 The lack of effective Palestinian control over the West
Bank is the main argument in support of the view that the
Palestinian political entity in that area does not meet the test for
statehood under international law.139 Assuming that international
law would recognize the existence of a state that does not have, and
has never had, the capacity to extend effective citizenship—a highly
doubtful proposition—relying on such recognition to narrow the
sphere of individuals who benefit from the human rights treaty
provisions on the prevention of statelessness would undercut the
rationale underlying these provisions.
e. Summary
The above analysis showed that a plausible, albeit not
undisputed, reading of treaty provisions that are binding on Israel
Al Kour, 6 PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L L.at 70.
See, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
446-47 (2nd ed. 2006) (rejecting the contention that a Palestinian state already
exists); Paul Eden, Palestinian Statehood: Trapped Between Rhetoric and Realpolitik, 62
INT’L. COMPAR. L.Q. 225, 233 (2013) (“[T]he powers currently possessed by the
Palestinian Authority fall short of the independence necessary for Palestine (as
currently constituted) to be regarded as a sovereign State.”); John Quigley, Palestine
is a State: A Horse with Black and White Stripes is a Zebra, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 749, 752
(2011) (contending that Palestine is a state); Francis A. Boyle, The Creation of the State
of Palestine, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301, 301-03 (1990) (arguing that Palestine meets the
criteria for statehood).
138
Jabareen, supra note 129 (“[W]ith the new recognition by 138 states of
Palestine as a state, Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem may
find themselves eligible for passports and nationality in the state of Palestine. It is
questionable, however, what kind of citizenship rights the state of Palestine could
provide as long as it remains under Israeli occupation.”).
139
Eden, supra note 137, at 233-34.
136
137
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in matters of nationality, namely, Article 24(3) of the ICCPR and
Article 7 of the Child Convention, suggests that Israel is obligated to
grant citizenship to individuals born in its territory, who would
otherwise be stateless. This part further argued that most West Bank
Palestinians are currently considered stateless. Therefore, if a given
area of the West Bank is considered to have become part of Israel,
most Palestinians subsequently born in such territory are plausibly
entitled to receive Israeli citizenship under the treaty obligations of
Israel, as a party to the ICCPR and to the Child Convention.
In the case of lawful annexation of territory by a state as a form
of state succession, there also seems to be an emerging right under
customary international law of the residents of the annexed territory
to receive the citizenship of the annexing state. The ILC Draft
Articles and the legal literature suggest that this emerging right, yet
to consolidate as lex lata, would not be restricted to children and
would not depend on whether or not the individuals concerned are
otherwise stateless.
International law prohibits the unilateral annexation by Israel of
the occupied West Bank. The inquiry regarding the right of West
Bank Palestinians to Israeli citizenship must therefore answer two
questions. First, do the treaty obligations of Israel in matters of
nationality, and the broader, emerging right to nationality under
customary international law, extend to the residents of territory that
has been illegally annexed by Israel? In other words, would the
illegal annexation by Israel of the West Bank make that territory a
part of Israel for the purposes of applying the norms of IHRL that
concern the right to nationality? Second, if the answer to the first
question is affirmative, do the policies pursued by Israel in relation
to the occupied West Bank amount to annexation?
III. ILLEGAL ANNEXATION AND THE RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP
a. Illegal Annexation and the Obligation of Non-Recognition
Attaching to illegal annexation a legal effect that extends as far
as the emergence of citizenship rights stands in tension with a wellestablished norm of customary international law, which holds that
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such annexation is null and void.140 As noted by Yoram Dinstein,
“any unilateral annexation by the Occupying Power of an occupied
territory—in whole or in part—would be legally stillborn.”141 This
norm derives from a fundamental principle of international law
concerning the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory through
the use of force.142
Moreover, the annexation by an occupier of an occupied
territory violates the right of peoples to self-determination,143 and
possibly the prohibition against the use of force.144 Both the right to
self-determination and the prohibition against the use of force have
acquired the status of peremptory norms of customary international
law.145 These norms are reinforced by the international law on the
140
See S.C. Res. 478, ¶¶ 2-3 (Aug. 20, 1980) (unanimously decreeing that the
annexation by Israel of occupied East Jerusalem is a violation of international law
and is therefore “null and void”); AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE WALL:
RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 24 (2017) (“Annexation . . .
does not alter the status of the territory or its population.”).
141
DINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 50.
142
See S.C. Res. 242, pmbl. (Nov. 22, 1967) (emphasizing “the inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territory by war”); Legal Consequences of the Construction of
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶
117 (July 9) (citing resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N.
Security Council, which “have referred, with regard to Palestine, to the customary
rule of ‘the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war’”); BENVENISTI, supra
note 26, at 6 (“The foundation upon which the entire law of occupation is based is
the principle of inalienability of sovereignty through unilateral action of a foreign
power, whether through the actual or the threatened use of force, or in any way
unauthorized by the sovereign.”).
143
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 121-22 (July 9) (noting
that actions by Israel that may result in the de facto annexation of parts of the West
Bank violate the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination).
144
BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 245, 349 (noting that de facto annexation of
occupied territory amounts to aggression).
145 See Glen Anderson, A Post-Millennial Inquiry into the United Nations Law of
Self-Determination: A Right to Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession?, 49 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1183, 1185 (2016) (“[S]elf-determination is widely regarded as a
peremptory norm (jus cogens) . . . .”); Peter G. Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value
Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in International Law, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 11
n.29 (2008) (“In the opinion of many jurists and writers, selfdetermination . . . enjoys the status of a peremptory norm (jus cogens).”); Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 190, 212 (June 27) (recognizing the prohibition on the use of force
as a peremptory norm); DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 99-104 (discussing the
peremptory nature of the prohibition on the use of force).
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responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts, which
decrees that states are under an obligation not to recognize as lawful
a situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm of
general international law, nor render aid or assistance in
maintaining that situation146 (“obligation of non-recognition”). The
obligation of non-recognition is a manifestation of the principle of
legality in international law. As noted by one commentator:
[T]he rationale of the obligation of non-recognition is to
prevent, in so far as possible, the validation of an unlawful
situation by seeking to ensure that a fait accompli resulting
from serious illegalities do not consolidate and crystallize
over time into situations recognized by the international
legal order . . . . [T]he function of non-recognition is to
vindicate the ‘legal character of international law against the
“law-creating effect of facts.”’147
The ILC observed that the obligation of non-recognition “not
only refers to the formal recognition of [a situation created by a
breach of a peremptory norm], but also prohibits acts which would
imply such recognition.” 148 This prohibition seems to extend to
“’any action which might confer a semblance of legitimacy on the
illegal regime.’”149
Recognizing a right to citizenship based on illegal annexation
would not cure the unlawfulness of the annexation. The “legally
stillborn” annexation would be brought to life only for the limited
purpose of citizenship, and its status as legally void would
otherwise remain unchanged. Yet, attaching to an illegal annexation
146
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts on its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 114, art. 41(2)
(2001)
[hereinafter
Draft
Articles
on
Responsibility
of
States],
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8JJM-9QGB].
147
Martin Dawidowicz, The Obligation of Non-Recognition of an Unlawful
Situation, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 677, 678 (James Crawford,
Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson eds., 2010) (quoting HERSCH LAUTERPACHT,
RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 430 (1947)).
148
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 146, at 114, cmt. 5
(alteration in original).
149
Dawidowicz, supra note 147, at 680 (quoting G.A. Res. 2946 (XXVII) (Dec.
7, 1972). See also G.A. Res. 2946 (XXVII), ¶ 5 (Dec. 7, 1972).
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legal consequences that extend as far as citizenship, the
distinguishing mark of the relationship between individuals and
their state, would strengthen the political claim of the annexing state
to sovereignty over the annexed territory, and would thereby erode
the political force of the principle of the inadmissibility of the
acquisition of territory through the use of force. Attributing such
legal effect to illegal annexation implicitly indicates a degree of
recognition by international law of the validity of the illegal
annexation, and cannot be reconciled with an absolute norm
mandating that such annexation is null and void. This departure
from the obligation of non-recognition would exact a toll on the
principle of legality in international law.
Yet, international law has allowed for limited erosion of the
principle that an illegal annexation is null and void, and of its
corollary, the obligation of non-recognition.
The interests
underlying these norms must, at times, be balanced against human
rights, and the contours of this balancing have been delineated by
international jurisprudence. The ICJ noted, in the 1971 Namibia
Advisory Opinion, 150 the obligation of states not to recognize the
authority of the illegal regime maintained by South Africa in
Namibia. 151 The ICJ recognized, however, an exception to the
obligation of non-recognition (the “Namibia exception”), which
considers the interests of individuals residing in territory controlled
by the illegal regime. The ICJ stated:
In general, the non-recognition of South Africa’s
administration of the Territory should not result in
depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived
from international co-operation. In particular, while official
acts performed by the Government of South Africa on behalf
of or concerning Namibia . . . are illegal and invalid, this
invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for
instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the

150 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. ¶ 16 (June 21).
151 Id. ¶¶ 123-24 (June 21).
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effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the
inhabitants of the Territory.152
Delineating the scope of the exception to the obligation of nonrecognition, the majority opinion in the Namibia Advisory Opinion
referred only to ex post facto recognition of acts of routine
administration, such as the registration of births, marriages, and
deaths. Yet, “the increasingly voluminous body of human rights
law has had an important effect on the obligation of non-recognition
and on the exception to it.”153 Thus, in recent years, the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has adopted a broad
construction of the Namibia exception, which provides for a broad
ex ante recognition of the legal authority of an illegal regime to the
extent that such authority is necessary for compliance with the
positive obligations of the regime to ensure and protect human
rights. This court examined the legislative and adjudicative
authority of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”),
an entity proclaimed as a state by the Turkish-Cypriot community
in the territory of northern Cyprus following the Turkish occupation
of that territory.154
The proclamation of the TRNC was widely condemned by the
international community as a violation by Turkey of international
law.155 No state except Turkey recognized the TRNC as a state, and
northern Cyprus remained in the eyes of the international
community a territory under Turkish occupation.156 The ECtHR has
recognized, however, the validity of criminal laws enacted by the
illegal regime of the TRNC on the ground that criminal legislation is
an essential instrument for the protection of human rights, and its
invalidity would be detrimental to the local population.157 Similarly,
the ECtHR recognized the validity of TRNC legislation that provides
Id. ¶ 125.
YAËL RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 88 (2011).
154
See Rhodri C. Williams, Introductory Note to the European Court of Human
Rights: Demopoulos v. Turkey, 49 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 816, 816-17 (2010), for a
historical review of the Turkish invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus and
the establishment of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” [TRNC].
155
Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 513, ¶¶ 19-23.
156
Williams, supra note 154, at 816.
157
Foka v. Turkey, App. No. 28940/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 83 (2008); Protopapa v.
Turkey, App. No. 16084/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 60 (2009).
152
153
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remedies for human rights violations, as well as the authority of
TRNC courts to apply this legislation,158 citing the need to “avoid in
the territory of northern Cyprus the existence of a vacuum in the
protection of . . . human rights.”159 Citing a threshold condition for
the admissibility of applications to the ECtHR, which requires
applicants to exhaust domestic remedies before applying to the
Court, the ECtHR held that victims of human rights violations by
Turkey in northern Cyprus cannot apply to the ECtHR before
exhausting the remedies offered by the TRNC legal system.160 It was
thus observed that “the ECtHR’s interpretation of the Namibia
Exception calls for a broad ex ante recognition of the legislative and
adjudicative authority of an illegal regime. This approach expands
the scope of the Namibia Exception.”161
The Court emphasized that this approach did not undermine the
position taken by the international community regarding the
illegality of the TRNC regime, and that it recognized the authority
of TRNC institutions only “for the limited purpose of protecting the
rights of the territory’s inhabitants.” 162 There is little doubt,
however, that the broad recognition by the ECtHR of the legal
authority of the TRNC “benefits the purported sovereignty of the
illegal regime,” 163 and significantly erodes the principle of nonrecognition.164 It has been noted that “[t]his jurisprudence provides
such a wide exceptional validity under the Namibia exception, that
little remains of the obligation of non-recognition insofar as internal

158 See Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 91-98 (2001);
Demopoulos v. Turkey, App Nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03,
10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04, 21819/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 92-96 (2010).
159 Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 91, 96 (2001);
Demopoulos v. Turkey, App Nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03,
10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04, 21819/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 92-96 (2010).
160
Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 98-99 (2001);
Demopoulos v. Turkey, App Nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03,
10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04, 21819/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 96-98 (2010).
161
Michal Saliternik, Bad Reliance in Public Law, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 1243, 1285
(2017).
162 Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 91-92 (2001); see also
Foka v. Turkey, App. No. 28940/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 84 (2008).
163
RONEN, supra note 153, at 95.
164
GROSS, supra note 140, at 93-94 (“Northern Cyprus is viewed as occupied
territory and the TRNC is unrecognized and considered illegal. But this
determination has been gradually eroded in the ECtHR’s case law.”).
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acts are concerned.”165 This expansive construction of the Namibia
exception is directly linked to the development of IHRL in the
decades following the Namibia Advisory Opinion.166
The breadth of the exception to the obligation of non-recognition
in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR seems to support extending the
norms of IHRL on the right to citizenship to situations of illegal
annexation. Both the annexation by an occupier of the occupied
territory and the establishment of the TRNC by Turkey, the occupier
of northern Cyprus, create an illegal regime in the occupied
territory, contrary to peremptory norms of international law.167 The
competing interests underlying the delineation by the ECtHR of the
exception to the obligation of non-recognition are identical to the
interests at stake when it comes to recognizing the legal effect of an
illegal annexation for the purpose of the right to citizenship: the
rights of the ousted sovereign, or in current parlance, the right to
self-determination, and the principle of legality, on one hand, and
the human rights of individuals, on the other. The breadth of the
exception to the obligation of non-recognition in the jurisprudence
of the ECtHR suggests that international law is inclined to grant the
latter precedence over the former. This inclination arguably extends
to the right of the residents of an unlawfully annexed territory to
receive the citizenship of the annexing state.
The ILC has explicitly restricted the purview of its Draft Articles
“to the effects of a succession of States occurring in conformity with
international law and, in particular, with the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”168
In the view of the ILC, “it was not incumbent upon it to study
questions of nationality which could arise in situations such as
illegal annexation of territory.”169 One commentator has noted that
RONEN, supra note 153, at 92.
Id. at 94 (“[T]he expansion of the Namibia exception is an inevitable
consequence of the expansion of international human rights law, which was not
fully envisaged in 1971.”).
167
See Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and the Criteria for
Statehood in International Law, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 75 (2015) (noting that the TRNC
was denied statehood because it was established in breach “of the interconnected
peremptory norms of the right of peoples to self-determination and the prohibition
on the illegal use of force”).
168
ILC Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, at 27, art. 3.
169 Id. at 27, art. 3, cmt. 2.
165
166
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in placing this restriction on the purview of its Draft Articles, “the
ILC confirmed that different rules and considerations apply in
situations of territorial changes contrary to international law,”170 so
that in such situations “[t]he starting point . . . on whether there are
any relevant rules affecting regulation of nationality is clearly
different.” 171 Note, however, that the ILC did not exclude the
possibility of a citizenship right emanating from an illegal
annexation. In its Commentary to the Draft Articles, the ILC
stressed that the restriction of its Draft Articles to situations of lawful
succession of states “is without prejudice to the right of everyone to
a nationality in accordance with Article 15 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.”172
The difference between any unilateral annexation by Israel of the
West Bank and situations of state succession addressed in the legal
literature on the right to citizenship and in the ILC Draft Articles
extends beyond the illegality of the former. A succession of states
concerns the replacement of a predecessor state by a successor state
in the sovereignty over territory. 173 To the extent that Israel has
annexed the West Bank, it is far from clear that there existed a
predecessor state, namely, a sovereign state of Palestine. Yet the
human rights rationale underlying the emerging right to citizenship
in situations of state succession equally applies where a state
annexes territory that was not a part of another state prior to the
annexation. The ILC indicated that the right to nationality laid out
in the Draft Articles “applies to this particular situation [of
succession of states] the general principle contained in Article 15 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was the first
international instrument embodying the ‘right of everyone to a
nationality.’” 174 This general principle seems to support the
extension of the emerging right to citizenship to situations of

Ziemele, supra note 99, at 229.
Id. at 236.
172
ILC Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, at 27, art. 3, cmt. 3.
173 Id. at 25, art. 2(a) (“‘Succession of States’ means the replacement of one State
by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory.”).
174 Id. at 25, art. 1, cmt. 1 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
170
171
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annexation that do not fall squarely within the definition of state
succession.175
In conclusion, this part has shown that the existing and
emerging IHRL obligations of Israel to grant citizenship to residents
of territory acquired by Israel extend to Palestinians residing in areas
of the West Bank illegally annexed by Israel. In other words, an
occupied territory unlawfully annexed by the occupier may be
viewed as part of the occupier’s own territory for the limited
purpose of the right to citizenship.
b. The Right of East Jerusalem Palestinians to Israeli Citizenship
In contrast to the bulk of the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem
has been formally annexed by Israel. 176 Therefore, even under a
narrow perception of annexation limited to formal annexation, the
existing and emerging IHRL obligations of Israel to grant citizenship
to residents of territory acquired by Israel seem to apply to
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem.
The path to citizenship for East Jerusalem Palestinians formally
laid out by domestic Israeli law seems consistent with the IHRL
treaty obligations of Israel under the ICCPR and the Child
Convention, regarding the granting of citizenship to persons born in
175
As a corollary of its narrow definition of succession of states, which
requires the existence of both a predecessor state and a successor state, the ILC has
limited the category of individuals whose right to citizenship is discussed in its
Draft Articles to “every individual who, on the date of the succession of States, had
the nationality of the predecessor State and whose nationality may be affected by
such succession.” See id. at 26, art. 2(f). This limitation seems irrelevant, however,
to situations in which an annexed territory was not a part of any state prior to its
annexation. It has been noted that the ILC has followed “the principle that aliens
resident in the territory do not acquire the nationality of the successor state.” See
Blackman, supra note 52, at 1168. This principle would hardly be relevant to an
Israeli annexation of the West Bank, as the Palestinian residents of the West Bank
cannot be considered aliens in this territory.
176 See § 1, Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 5740-1980, SH 980 186, (Isr.),
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZHT8-AC39] (“Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of
Israel.”); HCJ 282/88 Awad v. Prime Minister, 42(2) PD 424, 429 (1988) (Isr.) (noting
that Israel has annexed East Jerusalem); see also Asher Maoz, Application of Israeli
Law to the Golan Heights is Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 355, 366 (1994) (noting
that the enactment by Israel of Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel has
consolidated the annexation of East Jerusalem).
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Israel who would otherwise remain stateless. The opportunity to
acquire citizenship formally offered by Israel to the residents of East
Jerusalem may conceivably be reconciled also with the broader,
emerging norm of customary international law regarding the right
of persons residing in territory acquired by a state to receive the
citizenship of the latter.
The provisions of the Israeli Citizenship Law177 on the right of
stateless persons born in Israel to receive Israeli citizenship follow
the requirements of the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness, 178 although Israel is not party to the Convention.
Section 4A of the Citizenship Law stipulates that:
A person born after the establishment of the State of Israel in
a place that was an Israeli territory at the date of his birth,
and has never possessed any citizenship, will become an
Israeli citizen if he so requests within the period between his
eighteenth birthday and his twenty-first birthday, provided
that he has been a resident of Israel in the five consecutive
years prior to the submission of the request (“Statelessness
Clause”).179
The Minister of Interior has no discretion to deny the request
other than on the grounds that the person in question was convicted
of a national security offense, or was sentenced to imprisonment of
five years or more, having been convicted of any other offense.180
Although many East Jerusalem Palestinians are eligible for
citizenship under the Statelessness Clause,181 the Israeli government
has adopted a policy, yet to be reviewed by the courts, of channeling
requests for citizenship by East Jerusalem Palestinians away from
the Statelessness Clause, and processing such requests only under
the general naturalization provision contained in Section 5 of the
Citizenship Law, which is not limited to cases of statelessness.182
177

(Isr.).

See generally Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 50 (1951-52), as amended

See Statelessness Convention, supra note 70, and accompanying text.
§ 4A(a), Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 50 (1951-52), as amended (Isr.).
180
§ 4A(b), Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 50 (1951-52), as amended (Isr.).
181
AMNON RAMON & YAËL RONEN, RESIDENTS, NOT CITIZENS: ISRAELI POLICY
TOWARDS THE ARABS IN EAST JERUSALEM, 1967-2017 at 311 (2017).
182 Id. at 311-12.
178
179
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Section 5 of the Citizenship Law offers a path to citizenship through
naturalization to those who have been lawfully residing in Israel for
three of the five years preceding the application for citizenship,
provided that the applicant possesses some knowledge of the
Hebrew language and has renounced or otherwise forfeited foreign
citizenship. 183 Although Section 5 provides that the granting of
citizenship to individuals who meet these preconditions is subject to
the discretion of the Minister of Interior,184 the Supreme Court of
Israel appears to have taken the position that East Jerusalem
Palestinians who meet these preconditions are generally entitled to
citizenship.185 The Court noted that the entire population of East
Jerusalem would have been granted Israeli citizenship in the wake
of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, were it not for the
Palestinians’ own rejection of Israeli citizenship, and that “each one
[of the residents of East Jerusalem] has been given the option to
apply [individually] and receive Israeli citizenship . . . . Some have
applied and received Israeli citizenship.”186
Israel has placed procedural hurdles in the path to citizenship
offered to East Jerusalem Palestinians. The most significant of those
has been an unreasonably long timeframe of around six years for
receiving and processing citizenship applications.187 In some cases,
Israel has also presented applicants for citizenship with unrealistic
evidentiary requirements to prove residency in East Jerusalem.188
These procedural hurdles can hardly be reconciled with an
entitlement of East Jerusalem Palestinians to citizenship, and may
§ 5(a) Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 50 (1951-52), as amended (Isr.).
§ 5(b) Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 50 (1951-52), as amended (Isr.).
185
AdminA (DC Jer) 5829/05 Dari v. Ministry of the Interior, ¶ 9 Nevo Legal
Database (Feb. 1, 2007) (Isr.). Under the procedure laid out by the Ministry of the
Interior, citizenship applications may be rejected on security grounds or if the
applicant has been otherwise involved in criminal activity according to information
provided to the Minister by Israeli police. See RAMON & RONEN, supra note 181, at
313. These grounds for rejecting citizenship applications are yet to be reviewed by
the courts.
186
AdminA (DC Jer) 5829/05 Dari v. Ministry of the Interior, ¶ 9 Nevo Legal
Database (Feb. 1, 2007) (Isr.) (alteration in original).
187
Nir Hasson, Israel Vows to Drastically Cut Wait Time for Jerusalem
Palestinians’
Citizenship
Applications,
HAARETZ
(Feb.
26,
2019),
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-vows-to-cut-wait-timefor-jerusalem-palestinians-citizenship-applications-1.6975728
[https://perma.cc/N4LM-4KAU].
188
RAMON & RONEN, supra note 181, at 312.
183
184
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be viewed as contrary to existing and emerging IHRL norms on the
right to citizenship applicable to Israel. The Israeli government,
however, has recently pledged to the Supreme Court to drastically
expedite the naturalization process for East Jerusalem Palestinians,
so that the overall waiting period for submission and processing of
citizenship applications would be reduced to one year.189
In the five decades that have passed since the annexation of East
Jerusalem, only a small minority of East Jerusalem Palestinians have
applied for Israeli citizenship.190 The reluctance of East Jerusalem
Palestinians to apply for Israeli citizenship is largely of a political
nature because such action is perceived as a form of recognition of
Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem, contrary to Palestinian
national aspirations to establish a Palestinian state with East
Jerusalem as its capital. 191 In the past decade, however, as the
possibility of establishing a viable Palestinian state that extends to
East Jerusalem has become more and more distant, there has been a
sharp increase in the number of East Jerusalem Palestinians
applying for Israeli citizenship.192 Commentators predict that the
expected shortening of waiting periods for the receipt of citizenship
will further increase the number of citizenship applications
submitted by East Jerusalem Palestinians.193

189
Hasson, supra note 187; see also Nir Hasson, Israel Picks Up Pace, Grants
Citizenship to 1,200 East Jerusalem Palestinians, HAARETZ (Jan. 12, 2020),
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-picks-up-pace-grantscitizenship-to-1-200-east-jerusalem-palestinians-1.8384270
[https://perma.cc/BW3G-DTE9] (noting that recent data indicates that, in 2019, the
government has expedited the processing of citizenship applications submitted by
residents of East Jerusalem).
190
Michael Bachner, Israel to Dramatically Shorten East Jerusalemites’ Path to
Citizenship
–
Report,
TIMES
ISR.
(Feb.
27,
2019,
1:46
AM),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-to-dramatically-shorten-eastjerusalemites-path-to-citizenship-report/ [https://perma.cc/5ZYW-64TP].
191
Yaffa Zilbershats, Apartheid, International Law, and the Occupied Palestinian
Territory: A Reply to John Dugard and John Reynolds, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 915, 918 (2013)
(Following the annexation by Israel of East Jerusalem, the Palestinian residents of
the territory “were given the option of receiving Israeli citizenship, but at the time,
for political reasons, most chose not to request it.”).
192
RAMON & RONEN, supra note 181, at 316.
193
Hasson, supra note 187.
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IV. WHAT AMOUNTS TO ANNEXATION?
It has been observed that “international law today has more to
say about the legal consequences of an annexation than about what
qualifies as one.” 194 The international community has taken the
view that the full extension by an occupying state of its legislative
jurisdiction, judicial system, and administration to the occupied
territory amounts to annexation, whether or not these measures are
accompanied by an explicit proclamation of annexation by the
occupier. 195 Israel has taken legislative measures extending the
application of Israeli “law, jurisdiction and administration” to East
Jerusalem 196 and to the occupied Golan Heights. 197 Israeli
commentators and judges disagreed on whether these measures,
which were not accompanied by an explicit proclamation of
annexation, amounted to an act of annexation, 198 but the
international community overwhelmingly considered these

Dajani, supra note 18, at 52.
See infra notes 196-199 and accompanying text.
196
Law and Administration Order (No. 1), 5727-1967 (June 28, 1967).
197
§ 1, Golan Heights Law, 5742-1981, LSI 36 7 (1981-82) (Isr.).
198 See, e.g., Maoz, supra note 176, at 356-57 (noting that Israeli legislation
applying the laws, jurisdiction and administration of Israel to the Golan Heights
amounts to the annexation of this territory); Leon Sheleff, The Application of Israeli
Law to the Golan Heights is Not Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 333, 337 (1994)
(arguing that the Israeli legislation concerning the Golan Heights “does not amount
to annexation because it does no more than what is written therein; apply Israeli
law, administration and government to the Golan Heights”); HCJ 283/69 Ruweidi
v. Military Court in the Hebron District, 24(2) PD 419, 423 (1970) (Isr.) (examining
whether East Jerusalem is considered a part of Israel under domestic Israeli law,
Justice Cohn noted that “the thesis . . . that the application of Israeli law to a
particular area, is equivalent to the annexation of the area to the State of Israel, still
requires proof,” and that “there is . . . nothing to prevent the application of the law
of Israel to occupied territories even in the absence of any intention to annex them
to the area of the state”); Id. at 424 (Justice Yitzhak Kahan) (“[East Jerusalem] was
annexed to the State of Israel and constitutes part of its area.”). The controversy on
whether Israel annexed East Jerusalem has been resolved with the enactment by the
Israeli legislature of Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, which stipulated that
“Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel.” See Maoz, supra note 176,
at 366 (noting that following the enactment of the Basic Law, “there can no longer
be any argument regarding . . . Jerusalem’s constituting ‘part of the territory of the
state of Israel.’”); Sheleff, supra note 198, at 344.
194
195
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measures as such.199 I refer to the full extension by the occupier of
its legislative jurisdiction, judicial system, and administration to the
occupied territory as “formal annexation.”200
International law is unclear, however, on whether and to what
extent annexation of occupied territory may arise from conduct on
the part of the occupier that does not amount to formal annexation.201
With the exception of East Jerusalem, Israel has not effected the
formal annexation of the West Bank. Plans to formally annex large
parts of the West Bank, recently announced by the Prime Minister of
Israel,202 are yet to materialize. Israeli efforts to integrate parts of the
West Bank into Israel in the absence of formal annexation, manifest
in the settlement enterprise, have typically targeted only territories
outside Palestinian population centers, 203 as do plans to formally
annex parts of the West Bank.204

199
See
G.A.
Res.
52/68,
¶
7
(Feb.
20,
1998),
https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/52/68
[https://perma.cc/HU4L-H77D]
(“Reaffirming once more the illegality of the decision of 14 December 1981 taken by
Israel to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian
Golan, which has resulted in the effective annexation of that territory.”); G.A. Res.
51/135, ¶ 7 (Mar. 24, 1997), https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/51/135
[https://perma.cc/7AKP-VGWE]; Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the
European Community, Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten on Poland
and
Israeli
Golan
Heights
Policy
(Dec.
15,
1981),
http://aei.pitt.edu/5583/1/5583.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EGF8-VL6B]
(maintaining that the extension of Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to the
Golan Heights is “tantamount to annexation”); Maoz, supra note 176, 384-89
(reviewing the response of the international community to the application of Israeli
law, jurisdiction and administration to the Golan Heights, which regarded this
measure as annexation); BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 205 (noting that the
international community understood the application by Israel of its laws,
jurisdiction and administration to East Jerusalem as an attempt to annex East
Jerusalem).
200
The discussion below suggests that a proclamation of annexation that
remains an empty shell, namely, one that is not accompanied by the occupier’s
application of its legal and administrative systems to the occupied territory or by
any other operative measures by which the occupier treats the occupied territory as
its own, does not amount to annexation for the purpose of the right to citizenship.
See Part IV.c, infra.
201 See Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 2495, 2498; Dajani, supra note 18, at 52; see
also supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
202 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
203
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
204
See Holmes, supra note 2, and accompanying text.
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This Part explores two questions. First, should portions of the
West Bank be viewed, for the purpose of recognizing the right of
Palestinian residents of these territories to Israeli citizenship, as part
of Israel based on a doctrine that extends the concept of annexation
beyond formal annexation to encompass de facto annexation as well?
This Part answers this question in the affirmative and advances the
display of sovereignty test for the existence of annexation, which
brings together formal annexation and de facto annexation. This test
for annexation is satisfied by the occupier’s treatment of the
occupied territory as its own, namely, the occupier’s continuous
exercise in the occupied territory of governmental functions that are
typically reserved to a sovereign. The most distinct form of such
display of sovereignty concerns the full extension by the occupier of
its legal and administrative systems to the occupied territory. Yet,
the occupier’s treatment of the occupied territory as its own, which
satisfies the display of sovereignty test for annexation, may also take
the form of the settlement by the occupier of its own population
within the occupied territory, large-scale infrastructure projects
aimed at supporting such settlement activity, and a partial extension
of the occupier’s own legal system to the occupied territory.
Second, may the scope of annexation extend to population
centers within the occupied territory that are not targeted by the
occupier’s displays of sovereignty, when the occupier aims to tailor
its annexation of occupied territory around, and to the exclusion of,
such population centers to advance a “maximum land, minimum
population” annexation formula? This Part shows that a reasonable
application of the display of sovereignty test for annexation,
informed by the principle of legality in international law and by the
right of the people under occupation to self-determination, supports
recognizing such areas as annexed territory. This inquiry begins
with a brief review of Israeli policies promoting the integration of
parts of the West Bank into Israel.
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a. The Integration of Occupied Territory into Israel
i.

Facts on the Ground

Commentators correctly observed that “[t]he story of the
[Israeli] occupation is inseparable from the settlement enterprise.”205
Therefore, a review of the factual and legal realities established by
the settlement enterprise is essential for “identifying the basic
The
structure and nature of this occupation regime.” 206
establishment of settlements by Israel in the West Bank began
shortly after this territory came under Israeli occupation. At present,
some 620,000 Israeli settlers reside in settlements and “settlement
outposts” throughout the occupied West Bank.207 About 210,000 of
the settlers reside in neighborhoods built by Israel in the expanded
area of East Jerusalem, and some 410,000 settlers live in 131
settlements and roughly 110 settlement outposts in other parts of the
West Bank.208
The ICJ has observed that the establishment of settlements
violates Article 49 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (“Fourth Geneva
Convention”), which states that “[t]he Occupying Power shall not
deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the
territory it occupies.” 209 The Court reasoned that the prohibition
contained in Article 49 encompasses “not only deportations or
forced transfers of population . . . but also any measures taken by an
occupying Power in order to organize or encourage transfers of
parts of its own population into the occupied territory.”210 Similarly,
Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 579.
Id.
207
Statistics on Settlements and Settler Population, B’TSELEM (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.btselem.org/settlements/statistics
[https://perma.cc/3FBAWM7A].
208 Id.
209
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention]; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 120 (July 9).
210
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 120 (July 9).
205
206
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the U.N. Security Council has described Israel’s settlement policy as
a “flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.” 211 The
settlements enterprise has been criticized as an annexationist
measure.212
The settlements are supported by two main infrastructure
projects cementing their connection to Israel. The first is a massive
network of roads connecting the Israeli settlements to each other and
to Israel, bypassing Palestinian cities and towns, and thereby
“bringing Israeli territorial contiguity to the West Bank for the first
time in modern history.”213 Because the bypass roads network is
closed to Palestinians, it separates Palestinian population centers,214
dividing the West Bank into numerous non-contiguous zones. 215
Elaborating on the adverse effects of the bypass roads on the
national aspirations of the Palestinians, Samira Shah observed:
The bypass road network has devastating effects on
Palestinian statehood, sovereignty, and self-determination.
The roads carve up the West Bank, creating enclaves of
Palestinian authority with definite boundaries. The roads
prevent the expansion of these enclaves and ensure that
there will be no territorial contiguity in the West Bank. To
this end, there is a network of roads encircling every major
Palestinian city.216
The settlement enterprise is also supported by a barrier
constructed by Israel within the West Bank (“Barrier”). 217 The
S.C. Res. 465, ¶ 5 (Mar. 1, 1980).
See Charles F. Martel, Give Peace a Chance: How Considering Peace Process
Obligations Would Have Improved the Rulings of the International Court of Justice and the
Israeli Supreme Court on the Israeli Security Barrier, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 305,
335 (2007) (noting that the settlement enterprise is intended to ensure lasting Israeli
possession of the West Bank).
213
Samira Shah, On the Road to Apartheid: The Bypass Road Network in the West
Bank, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 221, 264-65 (1997).
214 Id. at 223 (observing that the bypass road network serves as “a military grid
in the West Bank, dividing and surrounding the Palestinian regions with militarilycontrolled roads”).
215
GROSS, supra note 140, at 154 (observing that the settlements and the bypass
roads “have divided the West Bank into some sixty non-contiguous zones”).
216
Shah, supra note 213, at 224-25.
217
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 79-84 (July 9).
211
212
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Barrier separates the bulk of the West Bank from both Israel proper
and from portions of the West Bank located between the Barrier and
the Green Line, which is the line that separates Israel proper from
the West Bank.218 The construction of the Barrier by Israel began in
2002, following a wave of terror attacks committed against Israelis
by Palestinians infiltrating Israel from the West Bank. The Barrier
was justified by Israel as a security measure aimed at preventing
terrorists from entering Israel and Israeli settlements in the West
Bank that are located in proximity to the Green Line.219 The portions
of the West Bank located on the Israeli side of the Barrier, between
the Barrier and the Green Line, are home to most of the Israeli
settlers as well as to Palestinian communities.220 The Barrier often
cuts off access by Palestinians on both sides of the Barrier to their
farmlands.221 It also isolates the Palestinians on the Israeli side of the
Barrier from the bulk of the West Bank, significantly restricting their
freedom of movement for purposes of work, trade, enjoyment of
basic services (e.g., education, healthcare), visiting family and
friends, and recreation.222
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (“Wall
Advisory Opinion”), the ICJ concluded that the construction of the
Barrier violates a range of humanitarian protections and human
rights guaranteed to the Palestinian population of the West Bank
under international humanitarian law and international human
rights law.223 Noting that the area between the Barrier and the Green
Line would include most Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and
that the construction of the Barrier would likely contribute to the
departure of Palestinians from this area, thereby altering its
demographic composition,224 the Court also expressed concern that
the Barrier would facilitate the de facto integration of this area into
Israel. 225 Commentators have observed that “[t]he settlement
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225

Id. ¶¶ 83-84.
Id. ¶ 116.
Id. ¶ 122.
Id. ¶ 133.
Id. ¶ 133.
Id. ¶¶ 123-37.
Id. ¶ 122.
Id. ¶ 121.
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program and the barrier preserving it constitute a deliberately
comprehensive physical, institutional, and demographic change in
the status of the West Bank intended to create a political reality too
difficult to reverse: lasting Israeli possession of contested
territory.”226

ii. The Legal System
The facts on the ground established by the settlement enterprise
walk hand in hand with the partial application of the Israeli legal
system to the occupied West Bank. Aeyal Gross observed:
Two separate legal systems operate concurrently in the West
Bank, effectively dividing the population along ethnic lines.
Jewish settlers are extraterritorially subject to Israeli civilian
law, whereas the Palestinians are subject to Israeli military
law and to the local law. Two main methods were used to
generate this situation. The first is the application of Israeli
law in personam to Jews and Israeli citizens in the OPT
[occupied Palestinian territories], and the second is the
partial application of Israeli law, on a supposedly territorial
basis, to the Jewish settlements in the OPT.227
The personal application of Israeli law to Israeli settlers in the
West Bank is secured primarily by Israeli legislation that, for the
purpose of Israeli statutes applicable to residents of Israel, extends
the category of Israeli residents to Israeli citizens living in the West
Bank. 228 This legislation brings Israeli settlers in the West Bank
within the purview of a wide range of Israeli statutes, including the
Income Tax Ordinance, the Social Security Law, and the National
Health Care Law. 229 In addition, Israeli legislation extends the
jurisdiction of Israeli courts to criminal offences committed by Israeli
Martel, supra note 212, at 335.
GROSS, supra note 140, at 172; see also, ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR., ONE RULE,
TWO LEGAL SYSTEMS: ISRAEL’S REGIME OF LAWS IN THE WEST BANK 6 (2014) [hereinafter
FOR
CIV.
RTS.
IN
ISR.],
https://law.acri.org.il/en/wpASS’N
content/uploads/2015/02/Two-Systems-of-Law-English-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4E3T-PCDY].
228
GROSS, supra note 140, at 172-73.
229 Id. at 173.
226
227
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citizens in the West Bank.230 It was observed that “[t]he net result is
a different set of rights and duties applying to different groups in
the OPT, along ethnic lines.”231
The Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) has generally avoided
extending its legislative jurisdiction to the West Bank on a territorial
basis. 232 The territorial application of Israeli law to the Israeli
settlements is secured by military legislation enacted by the Military
Commander of the West Bank. Although the Military Commander
is an Israeli official, he is considered under international law to be
the governmental authority of the occupied territory, formally
distinct from the Israeli government.233 The Military Commander
holds both legislative and administrative powers over the occupied

Id. at 172-73.
Id. at 173.
232
In 2017, the Israeli Knesset enacted the Law for the Regularization of
Settlement in Judea and Samaria, which represented a direct extension by the
Knesset of its legislative jurisdiction to the West Bank on a territorial basis. See Law
for the Regularization of Settlement in Judea and Samaria, 5777-2017, SH 2064 507
(Isr.) [hereinafter Regularization Law]. This legislation addressed many cases in
which Israeli settlements had been established on privately owned Palestinian land.
The legislation instructed the Military Commander in the West Bank to appropriate
such land for the purpose of its continued use by Israeli settlers, provided that the
settlement in question had been established “in good faith” or with the consent of
the State. See id. art. 3. It has been noted that the Regularization Law “is a unique
case of Knesset legislation that aims to directly regulate property rights over land
outside of Israel’s jurisdiction.” See Elena Chachko, Israel’s Settlement Regularization
Law: the Attorney General’s Extraordinary Brief and What it Means for Israel’s Legal
Stance on Illegal Settlements, LAWFARE (Dec. 8, 2017, 6:58 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/israels-settlement-regularization-law-attorney-ge
nerals-extraordinary-brief-and-what-it-means [https://perma.cc/UXQ4-TUA2].
The Regularization Law has been annulled by the Supreme Court of Israel, on the
grounds that it amounted to an unconstitutional violation of the rights of
Palestinian land owners to dignity, equality, and property, protected under the
Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. See HCJ 1308/17 Silwad
Municipality v. the Knesset (2020) (Isr.); Tamar Hostovsky Brandes, The Diminishing
Status of International Law in the Decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court Concerning the
Occupied Territories, INT’L J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author) (“The
Court circumvented the question of the application of the [Israeli] Basic Laws in the
Occupied Territories by determining that the Knesset’s authority to legislate is
restricted by the Basic Laws, regardless of where a law is to take effect . . . .”).
233
BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 4 (The law of occupation requires that the
administration established by the occupier in the occupied territory maintains
“formal independence of the occupying state.“).
230
231
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territory, which derive from the international law of occupation
rather than from Israeli law.234
Immediately after the West Bank came under Israeli occupation,
the Military Commander decreed, in accordance with the
international law of occupation, that the laws existing in the West
Bank prior to the occupation would remain in effect, subject to
legislation promulgated by the Military Commander.235 This legal
regime of pre-occupation law and military legislation ostensibly
applies to the entire territory of the West Bank, including Israeli
settlements. A series of by-laws promulgated by the Military
Commander, however, apply Israeli laws concerning the operation
of municipalities and the provision of governmental services within
Israel to the Israeli settlements in the West Bank.236 These by-laws
also established Courts of Domestic Affairs, a system of courts that
serves only the settlements.237 These courts are ostensibly separate
from the judicial system of Israel, but follow the procedures
prevailing in Israeli courts.238 The judges of the Courts of Domestic
Affairs are appointed by the Military Commander from among the
judges of Israeli courts.239 The military legislation establishing the
234
Uri Shoham, The Principle of Legality and the Israeli Military Government in
the Territories, 153 MIL. L. REV. 245, 251 (1996) (“Under customary international law,
the Military Commander of the occupying forces holds not only the highest
executive power in the area but also the power to legislate.”); HCJ 7957/04
Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, 60(2) PD 477, 492 (2005) (Isr.) (noting that the
Military Commander derives his power from public international law pertaining to
belligerent occupation).
235
BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 212 (citing Proclamation Concerning Law and
Administration (no. 2) (June 7, 1967), http://nolegalfrontiers.org/militaryorders/mil03c849.html?tmpl=component&print=1&page=&lang=en
[https://perma.cc/B2C2-JLHJ] (issued by the Military Commander of the West
Bank)).
236
BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 234-36; GROSS, supra note 140, at 174 (noting
that orders issued by the Military Commander “confer special status on Jewish
settlements in the [occupied Palestinian territory] by applying to these territorial
units certain aspects of Israeli law in various spheres, such as education, granting
them the privileges enjoyed by localities within Israel.”).
237
BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 236.
238
See HCJ 336/99 Delta Inv. & Com. (Karnei Shomron) Ltd. v. Court of
Domestic Affs. in Ariel, 55(3) PD 246, 260 (2001) (cited in ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR.,
supra note 227, at 20) (The Supreme Court of Israel noted that one of the purposes
of establishing the Courts of Domestic Affairs was to achieve “maximal
equalization between proceedings in the area court [courts in the West Bank serving
the settlements] and proceedings in courts in Israel.”).
239
BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 237.
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Courts of Domestic Affairs granted them jurisdiction to adjudicate a
broad range of civil and criminal matters, and provided for the
application of Israeli laws to the settlements in the fields of welfare
law, personal status law, education law, health law, labor law,
agriculture law, condominium law, environmental law, consumer
protection and commerce law, communications law, and religion
laws.240
Eyal Benvenisti observed that:
The enactments of the military authorities created a special
legal system in the settlements, a system that adopted Israeli
law, administration, and jurisdiction while at the same time
excluding them from otherwise applicable local laws . . . .
[T]he by-laws created in the settlements a legal environment
similar to that found within Israel.241
Commentators have observed that the partial application of
Israeli law to the West Bank has blurred the boundaries between
Israel and the West Bank, transforming the status of the latter from
“escrow” held in trust by the occupier to legal “mongrel,” as the
occupied territories “have gradually been incorporated in practice
into the realm of Israel’s rule.”242

Id. at 236; ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR., supra note 227, at 20-21.
BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 235-36 (observing further that “[t]he municipal
regime of the settlements enacted by the by-laws was fashioned according to the
Israeli municipal system. Many provisions in the by-laws explicitly incorporated
Israeli primary and secondary legislation, including provisions relating to planning
and building and to licensing of businesses.”).
242
Amnon Rubinstein, The Changing Status of the “Territories” (West Bank and
Gaza): From Escrow to Legal Mongrel, 8 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 59, 67, 79 (1988); see also
Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 586. Tamar Hostovsky Brandes
argues that the jurisprudence of the Israeli Supreme Court has contributed to the
“creeping annexation” of the West Bank. Hostovsky Brandes, supra note 232, at 2.
Hostovsky Brandes commented on the judicial review exercised by the Supreme
Court over the actions of Israeli authorities with regard to the West Bank, observing
that “while the international law of occupation still operates, officially, as the
governing normative framework in the Occupied Territories, . . . the Court has
increased its reliance on Israeli administrative law, and, in recent years, also on
Israeli constitutional law. As a result, the distinction between the Occupied
Territories and Israel is blurred.” Id.
240
241
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b. The Parameters of de facto Annexation
Discussion by courts and commentators of the existence of
annexation beyond situations of formal annexation has revolved
around the notion of de facto annexation. 243 This discussion
addressed de facto annexation as a concept that denotes, in the same
way that formal annexation does, a violation by the occupier of the
prohibition against the use of force or of the right of the people
under occupation to self-determination. 244 Attempts to define de
facto annexation have also concerned the significance of this form of
annexation as a parameter of the illegality of occupation. 245 This
discussion reveals three possible tests for the existence of de facto
annexation.
i.

The Purpose-Based Test for Annexation

The purpose-based test for de facto annexation assumes that the
conduct of an occupier that falls short of a formal act of annexation,
but nevertheless attests to the occupier’s “intention to hold the
territory permanently under its dominion,”246 must be considered as
Infra notes 244-245.
BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 245, 349 (noting that de facto annexation
amounts to aggression); Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 553-56, 592,
597-605 (inferring from the right of peoples to self-determination and from the
principle regarding the inalienability of sovereignty through the use of force a
“reasonable time” limit on the duration of occupation, and arguing that de facto
annexation marks a violation of this norm); Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 2472-76,
2494-98 (addressing possible tests for the existence of de facto annexation, and noting
that such annexation implicates the norm concerning the inadmissibility of the
acquisition of territory by war); Dajani, supra note 18, at 51 (asking whether conduct
that amounts to de facto annexation “rise[s] beyond a violation of the jus in bello to
contravene the jus ad bellum”); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 184 (July 9)
(noting that actions by Israel that may result in the de facto annexation of parts of
the West Bank violate the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination).
245
Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 601-05.
246
Dajani, supra note 18, at 52 (noting that traditional international law
considered annexation to have occurred whenever a conquering state that had
gained “effective possession” of the territory in question clearly manifested its
“intention to hold the territory permanently under its dominion”); see also COLEMAN
243
244
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a form of annexation. This approach takes into account a broad
range of conduct on the part of the occupier that reveals
annexationist intentions. Such conduct may include the refusal by
the occupier to engage in good faith negotiations aimed at ending
the occupation, statements by officials of the occupying state that do
not amount to formal annexation but indicate that the occupier
considers the occupied territory its own, legal measures that
partially apply the laws and administration of the occupying state
to the occupied territory, and the establishment by the occupier of
facts on the ground that contribute to the integration of the occupied
territory into the territory of the occupier. It has thus been argued
that the vast settlement enterprise conducted by Israel in the West
Bank, the infrastructure facilitating the integration of the settlements
into Israel, 247 statements made by Israeli officials regarding the
political purpose of the settlements and of the Barrier, and the partial
application by Israel of its laws to the occupied territories reveal a
political purpose of perpetuating Israel’s possession of parts of the
West Bank.248 It has been argued that the intention revealed by the
conduct of Israel meets the test for de facto annexation.249
PHILLIPSON, TERMINATION OF WAR AND TREATIES OF PEACE 9 (1916) (cited in Dajani,
supra note 18, at 52).
247
See supra notes 213-222 and accompanying text (discussing the road system
connecting the settlements to Israel and the Barrier separating most settlements
from other parts of the West Bank).
248
See Martel, supra note 212, at 335; Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note
7, at 601 (inferring from Israel’s actions in the West Bank “an intention to retain its
presence there indefinitely”); John Dugard (Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights), Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab
Territories, Including Palestine, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/6 (Sept. 8, 2003)
[hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur] (“[T]he construction of the Wall
within the West Bank and the continued expansion of settlements, which, on the
face of it, have more to do with territorial expansion, de facto annexation or
conquest, raise serious doubts about the good faith of Israel’s justifications in the
name of security.”); David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of
International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L. L. 88, 92 (2005) (“The debate in Israel
clearly demonstrates that the government did indeed have political intentions in
setting the barrier’s route.”); Dajani, supra note 18, at 54 (arguing that Israel’s actions
in the West Bank are probative of annexationist intent).
249
Dajani, supra note 18, at 55 (submitting that, in view of annexationist
intentions demonstrated by Israel through its actions in the West Bank and the
position taken by Israeli negotiators, “the international community need not wait
for a formal act of annexation to consider that it has occurred”); Report of the
Special Rapporteur, supra note 248, at ¶ 6 (“[T]he fact must be faced that what we
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Examining the lawfulness under international law of the
construction of the Barrier, the Supreme Court of Israel rejected the
view that this measure revealed an annexationist intention on the
part of Israel. 250 The Court acknowledged that “the Military
Commander is not authorized to order the construction of the
separation fence if his reasons are political. The purpose of the
separation fence cannot be the ‘annexation’ of territories [of the West
Bank] to the State of Israel. The purpose of the separation fence
cannot be to draw a political border.”251 The Court proceeded to
conclude, however, that the construction of the Barrier was not
motivated by a political purpose of shaping the borders of Israel, but
rather by the security interest in preventing the infiltration of
terrorists into Israel and into the Israeli settlements in the West
Bank.252 The Court did not consider whether the establishment by
Israel of settlements in the West Bank and the partial application of
Israeli law to the West Bank reveal an annexationist intention.
Rather, the Court addressed the construction of the Barrier in
isolation from other measures taken by Israel that facilitate the
integration of parts of the West Bank into Israel, considering the
settlements only as the premise of the security argument for the
incursion of the Barrier into the West Bank.253
A review of the legal literature reveals nuanced approaches to
the application of the purpose-based test for de facto annexation.
According to one approach, the required intention on the part of the
occupier must be “to take territory in perpetuity . . . to take
sovereignty.”254 I term this approach the “narrow purpose-based
test for annexation.” The second approach extends the definition of
annexation to any significant prolongation by the occupier of the
occupation that is contrary to international law. Such an approach
are presently witnessing in the West Bank is a visible and clear act of territorial
annexation under the guise of security.”); Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note
7, at 601-05 (concluding that the actions of Israel in the West Bank amount to de facto
annexation because they reveal an intention on the part of Israel to retain its
presence in this territory indefinitely).
250
HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Gov’t of Isr., 43 ILM 1099, 1108
(2004) (Isr.).
251 Id.
252 Id. at 1109.
253 Id.
254
Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 2472.
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measures the existence of de facto annexation based on the range of
interests that an occupier may legitimately promote by maintaining
the occupation and negotiating its termination, which many
commentators view to be limited to reasonable security
considerations.255 An occupied territory is considered to have been
annexed if the occupier prolongs the occupation to advance interests
that exceed this range of legitimate interests, even if an intention to
take the territory in perpetuity cannot be established. I term this
approach the “broad purpose-based test for annexation.” Applying
this approach, Eyal Benvenisti observed that the occupier has a duty
under international law to negotiate in good faith a peaceful solution
ending the occupation, and that “the failure to do so should be
considered outright annexation,” 256 in violation of international
law. 257 Benvenisti asserted that the conduct of good faith
negotiations requires the occupier to limit the conditions it presents
for ending the occupation to “reasonable security interests,”258 and
implied that such interests are restricted to those security objectives
that a state may promote in a war of self-defense.259
Under the broad purpose-based test for annexation, Israel could
be viewed to have annexed a given area of the West Bank if it uses
the occupation of that area as a bargaining chip to extract Palestinian
territorial concessions with regard to other parts of the West Bank.
Annexation would also result under this approach if Israel uses the
occupation to extract a Palestinian concession with regard to the
255
See BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 245-46 (“[N]o . . . claim of illegality would
be proper as long as the occupant’s conditions for peaceful settlement of the conflict
are motivated by reasonable security interests.”); CASSESE, supra note 26, at 55
(arguing that an occupier may not maintain the occupation unless “it is justified by
Article 51 of the UN Charter [i.e., the self-defense exception to the prohibition on
the use of force] and, therefore, being restricted to the need to repel an act of
aggression, is limited in duration”); see also Stephen M. Schwebel, Editorial
Comment, What Weight to Conquest?, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 344, 345-46 (1970) (“A state
acting in lawful exercise of its right of self-defense may seize and occupy foreign
territory as long as such seizure and occupation are necessary to its self-defense. . . .
As a condition of its withdrawal from such territory, that state may require the
institution of security measures reasonably designed to ensure that that territory
shall not again be used to mount a threat or use of force against it of such a nature
as to justify exercise of self-defense.”).
256
BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 245.
257 Id. at 245, 349.
258 Id. at 246.
259 Id. at 17.
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claim of the Palestinians to a right of return of Palestinian refugees
to the territory of Israel proper; to advance any other political
interest transcending security considerations; or to promote security
interests that exceed the limits of the right to self-defense.
ii.

The Effects-Based Test for Annexation

The second test for de facto annexation is effects-based. This test
was adopted by the ICJ in the Wall Advisory Opinion. The Court
addressed the question of de facto annexation in considering whether
the construction of the Barrier in the West Bank violated the right of
the Palestinian people to self-determination.260 The government of
Israel assured the Court that the Barrier was not intended as an
instrument of annexation, but rather “solely as a temporary,
nonviolent defensive measure to guard against suicide and other
attacks against Israel and Israelis.”261 The ICJ noted the assurance
provided by Israel regarding the purpose of the Barrier, leaving it
unchallenged without any further evaluation of its credibility. 262
The ICJ also refrained from examining whether the settlement
enterprise and the legal regime applied by Israel to the settlements
and to the settlers reveal an annexationist intention on the part of
Israel, which meets the purpose-based test for de facto annexation.
Noting, however, that the area between the Barrier and the Green
Line would include most Israeli settlements illegally established in
the West Bank, and that the construction of the Barrier would likely

260
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 122 (July 9).
261
Written Statement of the Government of Israel on Jurisdiction and
Propriety ¶ 1.8, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 122 (July 9),
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/131/1579.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MP6J-24L8].
262
See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 121 (July 9); see also
Kretzmer, supra note 248, at 92 (noting that the ICJ refrained from contesting Israel’s
assurance that the Barrier is not an instrument of annexation “probably because it
did not have the evidentiary basis to do so”).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/6

2020]

The Emerging Right of West Bank Palestinians

329

contribute to the departure of Palestinians from this area, changing
its demographic composition,263 the Court proceeded to state:
[The Court] cannot remain indifferent to certain fears
expressed to it that the route of the wall will prejudge the
future frontier between Israel and Palestine, and the fear that
Israel may integrate the settlements and their means of
access. The Court considers that the construction of the wall
and its associated régime create a “fait accompli” on the
ground that could well become permanent, in which case,
and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall
by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto annexation.264
Joshua Kleinfeld observed that:
This is essentially an effects-based test for annexation; the
suggestion is that the Barrier might change facts on the
ground (demographics, for example, as Israelis move into
and Palestinians move out of the West Bank land on the
Israeli side of the Barrier) in such a way as to make a
restoration of the Green Line untenable in the future.265
The effects-based test hinges upon the identification of the point of
no return, which marks a factual integration of the occupied
territory into the occupying state, which is so entrenched that it
cannot be reversed.
Applying the effects-based test, the ICJ appears to have been
unconvinced that the integration of parts of the West Bank into
Israel, resulting from Israeli policies, has reached the point of no
return.
The Court stopped short of determining that the
construction of the Barrier, considered together with the settlement
enterprise, currently amount to de facto annexation. Rather, the
Court observed that the Barrier has the potential of becoming a
permanent, irreversible reality, “in which case . . . it would be
tantamount to de facto annexation.”266 The Court took the view that
263
See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 122 (July 9).
264 Id. ¶ 121.
265
Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 2474-75.
266
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 121 (July 9).
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the possibility that the Barrier becomes a permanent reality in the
future suffices to conclude that its construction violates the right of
the Palestinian people to self-determination.267
iii. The Display of Sovereignty Test for Annexation
ICJ Judge Koroma, concurring with the Wall Advisory Opinion
of the Court, took the view that “the construction of the wall has
involved the annexation of parts of the occupied territory by Israel,
the occupying Power, contrary to the fundamental international law
principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force.” 268 Judge
Koroma reasoned that by building the wall inside the occupied
Palestinian territories, Israel has “embark[ed] there on activities of a
sovereign nature which will change their status as occupied
territory.”269 This approach, equating annexation with “activities of
a sovereign nature” on the part of the occupier, suggests a test for
the existence of annexation that brings together formal and de facto
annexation. This test for annexation, which I term the display of
sovereignty test, requires the occupier’s continuous exercise in the
occupied territory of governmental functions that are typically
reserved to a sovereign.
The display of sovereignty test is naturally satisfied by formal
annexation, namely, the full extension by the occupier of its legal
and administrative systems to the occupied territory. 270 Yet,
activities of a sovereign nature, which satisfy the display of
sovereignty test for annexation, may also take the form of the
settlement by the occupier of its own population in the occupied
territory, substantial infrastructure projects aimed at supporting

Id. ¶ 122.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma, 2004
I.C.J. 136, ¶ 2 (July 9).
269 Id.
270
See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
267
268
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such settlement activity, and a partial extension of the occupier’s
legal system to the occupied territory. 271
Advancement by the occupier of the purpose of holding the
territory in perpetuity typically entails conduct that amounts to the
display of sovereignty. 272 The distinction between the narrow
purpose-based test for annexation, which requires an intention to
hold the territory in perpetuity and the display of sovereignty test is
therefore of little practical significance.
By contrast, the distinction between the display of sovereignty
test and the broad purpose-based test for annexation seems
significant. An occupier could conceivably prolong the occupation
significantly by using it as a bargaining chip to advance illegitimate
interests, conduct that amounts to de facto annexation under the
broad purpose-based test, while otherwise complying with a range
of international humanitarian law provisions that prohibit an
occupier from actions amounting to the display of sovereignty.273
The display of sovereignty test for de facto annexation is also distinct
from the effects-based test, as the display of sovereignty by the
occupier does not necessarily result in permanent, irreversible
integration of the occupied territory into the occupying state.

271
GROSS, supra note 140, at 172 (“Israel’s establishment of settlements in the
[occupied Palestinian territory], together with the application of Israeli law to the
settlements and their residents, are more an exercise of sovereignty than of
occupation.”); id. at 176 (“Israel acts in the [occupied Palestinian territory] as a
sovereign insofar as it settles its citizens there and extends to them its laws on a
personal and on a mixed personal/territorial basis.”).
272
Dajani, supra note 18, at 53 (applying the purpose-based test for annexation,
Dajani notes that a state’s “intention to hold a territory ‘under its dominion,’ . . .
may be signaled by a state’s exercise, for a prolonged time, of the kinds of
governmental functions typically reserved to a sovereign.”).
273
Examples of such humanitarian law prohibitions include Article 49(6) of
the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the occupying state from settling
its own population within the occupied territory, and Article 64 of the Convention,
which limits the liberty of the occupier to legislate for the occupied territory. See
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 209, arts. 49, 64.
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c. The Proposed Test for Annexation for the Purpose of the Right to
Citizenship
This Article proposes the application of the display of
sovereignty test for annexation in determining whether West Bank
Palestinians have a right to Israeli citizenship. According to this
view, the prolongation of the occupation, even if linked to
annexationist intentions of the occupier, does not in itself amount to
annexation. The parameters of annexation consist in, and are
limited to, actions by the occupier, both in the form of legal measures
and in the establishment of facts on the ground, which bear the
distinguishing mark of sovereignty.
Part III has shown that applying the norms of IHRL on
citizenship to the relationship between the residents of an illegally
annexed territory and the annexing state requires an exception to the
principle that illegal annexation has no legal effect. The ILC
concluded, relying on IHRL, that situations of state succession,
including the lawful annexation of territory by the successor state,
give rise to a right of the residents of the territory in question to
receive the citizenship of the successor state, but excluded situations
of illegal annexation from the scope of its analysis.274 According to
the argument for extending the norms of IHRL on citizenship also
to the illegal annexation of territory by an occupier, the reality facing
the residents of an annexed territory, and therefore their interests in
obtaining the citizenship of the annexing state, are similar in the case
of both legal and illegal annexation. This argument informs the
appropriate test for the existence of illegal annexation.
For the purpose of the right to citizenship, the concept of illegal
annexation denotes a factual reality that resembles the one that
typically emanates from the lawful acquisition of a territory by a
state. Determining the existence of illegal annexation by the
occupier reflects the recognition that the occupied territory has
become, in reality, a part of the occupying state, and that the
residents of that territory are therefore entitled to receive the
citizenship of the occupying state in the same way that residents of
a territory that has been lawfully acquired by a state are entitled to
its citizenship. Pronouncing the existence of illegal annexation
274

See supra notes 85-91, 168-171 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/6

2020]

The Emerging Right of West Bank Palestinians

333

conveys that the former are on a par with the latter when it comes to
the right to citizenship because of the similarity between the factual
realities. This function of the concept of illegal annexation ties the
existence of annexation to the occupier’s treatment of the occupied
territory as its own, and therefore points to the display of
sovereignty test for annexation.
The display of sovereignty test for annexation is a factual test,
but its application may be informed by normative considerations. A
strict application of the display of sovereignty test would preclude
extending the scope of annexation to portions of an occupied
territory that are not the object of the occupier’s annexationist
policies. There is, however, a strong normative argument against
allowing an occupier to pick and choose small, densely populated
areas within the occupied territory that the occupier would exclude
from the realm of annexation and thereby from the sway of the right
to citizenship. This argument concerns both the principle of legality
in international law and the right to self-determination.
Annexation of occupied territory violates jus cogens and is
considered under international law to be null and void.275 Attaching
to such annexation legal consequences that extend as far as
citizenship, which is the distinguishing mark of the relationship
between individuals and their state, erodes the political force of this
legal principle and implicitly indicates a degree of recognition by
international law of the validity of the illegal annexation. This exacts
a toll on the principle of legality in international law. A theory that
derives a right of West Bank Palestinians to Israeli citizenship from
the annexation of occupied territories by Israel accepts such costs. It
seems, however, that the principle of legality would be further
harmed if the occupier were allowed to tailor an “illegal annexation
bargain” that is most favorable to it with respect to the legal and
political consequences of annexation. This would be the case if the
occupier were allowed to draw, applying a “maximum land,
minimum population” formula, the boundaries of the illegally
annexed territory whose residents are entitled to the occupier’s
citizenship, and with regard to which a sovereignty claim by the
occupier would gain political strength.
Granting legal effect, insofar as citizenship rights are concerned,
to efforts on the part of Israel to design the annexation so that it
275
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encompasses as much territory and as little of the population as
possible would greatly facilitate and benefit such efforts. The
application by Israel of such annexation policy may diminish the
capacity of the Palestinian people to exercise its right to selfdetermination in the form of statehood to the point where
Palestinians are completely divested of that right. An international
stance that benefits such policy, leaving most Palestinians without
an alternative option of realizing the right to self-determination
through the exercise of Israeli citizenship rights, would be
detrimental to the right of the Palestinian people to selfdetermination.
When the geographic spread of displays of sovereignty by the
occupier resembles a thick web, viewing the entire occupied
territory covered by that web, including the “holes” in which the
occupier does not act as a sovereign, as subject to annexation does
not seem a significant stretch of the display of sovereignty test for
annexation. Similarly, the greater the geographic proximity
between (a) areas within the occupied territory that are subject to
displays of sovereignty by the occupier and (b) other occupied areas
in which the occupier did not act as a sovereign, the more plausible
it is to consider the latter to have been annexed under the display of
sovereignty test.
As noted above, settlement activity by the occupier is a form of
display of sovereignty that contributes significantly to the existence
of annexation. Currently, over two hundred Israeli settlements and
settlement outposts are spread across the entire West Bank. 276
Considering the small size of the West Bank (approximately 2,180
square miles), 277 it is clear that the settlements, the infrastructure
supporting them, and the legal regime applied by Israel to the
settlements form a thick web of displays of sovereignty on the part
of Israel throughout the West Bank. Therefore, a reasonable
application of the display of sovereignty test, which is based on the
current map of settlements and is informed by the normative
interest in preventing the tailoring by the occupier of a “maximum
land, minimum population” annexation map, would result in the
See supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
West
Bank,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/West-Bank
[https://perma.cc/P9W3NBKN] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
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entire West Bank being considered to have been annexed. This
result would allow all West Bank Palestinians to claim a right to
Israeli citizenship based on the emerging right to citizenship in
customary IHRL.
Given the small size of the West Bank, a distribution of
settlements that avoids the annexation of the entire West Bank under
the display of sovereignty test would have to be confined to the
margins of this territory, requiring the removal of a large number of
settlements. Settlements located at the margins of the West Bank
would not color the entire West Bank as annexed territory, but
would bring into the realm of annexation any Palestinian city, town,
or village in their vicinity that is located between two settlements or
between an Israeli settlement and the territory of Israel proper,
defined by the Green Line.
The above discussion suggests that, in view of the current map
of settlements, the formal annexation planned by Israel would not
have a transformative effect on the status of the West Bank. Even in
the absence of formal annexation, the settlement enterprise satisfies
the display of sovereignty test for annexation with regard to the
entire West Bank.
The application of the proposed test for annexation must take
into account the devastating effect that granting Israeli citizenship
to all or most West Bank Palestinians would have on the character
of Israel as a Jewish state. The next section addresses the tension
between the interest in Israel maintaining such character and the
emerging right of West Bank Palestinians to Israeli citizenship and
discusses the legal consequences of such tension for the application
of the proposed test for annexation.
d. The Annexation of West Bank Territories and the Character of Israel
as a Jewish State
The existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish state has been
justified as the expression of the right of the Jewish people to selfdetermination. 278 The view that a Jewish state is a proper
manifestation of the right of the Jewish people to self-determination
278
Frances Raday, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, 26 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 453, 470 (2003).
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relies primarily on an argument that is analogous with affirmative
action theory.279 It has been noted that “affirmative action policies
are routinely justified on the basis of compensation for past
discrimination,” 280 and that this justification “work[s] well in
defense of a Jewish state. In terms of historical discrimination,
Justice Frankfurter’s observation that the Jews represent ‘the most
vilified and persecuted minority in history’ can hardly be denied.”281
Elaborating on the strength of the right of the Jewish people to selfdetermination in the form of a Jewish state, Frances Raday observed:
The Jewish claim to self-determination is based on the
desperate need to correct historic wrongs on a global scale,
resulting from persecution and discrimination by a majority
of host States over nearly two thousand years of history and
culminating in the Holocaust in Europe in the twentieth
century. It is, arguably, the only case of a claim to selfdetermination in rem, as it might be termed, against the entire
world.282
The character of Israel as a Jewish state hinges on the retention
of a solid Jewish majority among citizens of the country, which
would not be possible if the bulk of the Palestinian population of the
West Bank were granted Israeli citizenship.283 This does not justify
the type of ethnic oppression manifested in the denial of citizenship
to non-Jewish residents of territory annexed by Israel, either
formally or de facto. Reliance on the right of the Jewish people to
self-determination cannot pave the way to a legal regime whose
hallmark is the rule of one ethnic group over another through the
discriminatory denial of citizenship rights, which would bear
resemblance to an apartheid regime.

See Zasloff, supra note 80, at 208.
Id.
281 Id. at 209.
282
Raday, supra note 278, at 462.
283
Id. at 470 (“The Israeli government is not and cannot become sovereign
over the entire Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza without forfeiting
the expression of its own self-determination. The basis for Israeli Statehood has
been and continues to be the right of the Jewish people to self-determination. For
this to be feasible, the State of Israel must have a majority of Jews in the population
and hence, the government.”)
279
280
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I argue, however, that the legal significance of the right of the
Jewish people to self-determination justifies allowing Israel a
reasonable time period to secure its Jewish character in a manner
that is consistent with the emerging right to citizenship and its
application to cases of annexation. There is strong precedent in
constitutional and administrative law of various jurisdictions for
allowing the state a reasonable adjustment period where an
immediate application of the law stated by the courts would be
detrimental to a legitimate interest of the state or to individual
interests. Domestic courts enunciating the unconstitutionality of
legislation often postpone its nullification for an adjustment period
during which the legislator can determine how to remedy the
constitutional flaw.284 Such postponement was deemed necessary to
prevent a “legislative void” that would compromise an essential
public interest.285 For similar reasons, domestic courts pronouncing
the unlawfulness of administrative rules have increasingly turned to
the practice of remanding such rules without vacating them, which
allows the administrative agency to continue to implement the rule
as it works to amend the flaws underlying its unlawfulness.286
International law requires a state in violation of an international
law obligation to cease such violation immediately and
unconditionally.287 In view of the innovative nature of the proposed
legal construction that would entitle the Palestinians to Israeli
citizenship based on unlawful, de facto annexation, it is possible,
284 See Schachter v. Can. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (Can.); HCJ 1715/97 Chamber of
Inv. Managers in Isr. v. Minister of Fin., 51(4) PD 367, 417 (1997); see also Saliternik,
supra note 161, at 1281.
285
Schachter, 2 S.C.R. at 715 (“A Court may strike down legislation or a
legislative provision but suspend the effect of that declaration until Parliament . . .
has had an opportunity to fill the void. This approach is clearly appropriate where
striking down of a provision poses a potential danger to the public . . . or otherwise
threatens the rule of law . . . .”); Chamber of Inv. Managers in Isr., supra note 284,
51(4) PD at 417.
286
Saliternik, supra note 161, at 1270-1272 (reviewing such decisions by U.S.
courts).
287
Olivier Corten, The Obligation of Cessation, in THE LAW OF INT'L
RESPONSIBILITY 545, 548 (James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson eds., 2010)
(“In law, a State must and can always put an end to a continuing breach [of
international law].”); Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 146, at 88,
art. 30 (stipulating that a state “responsible for internationally wrongful conduct is
under an obligation” to cease such conduct, if it is continuing, without recognizing
the possibility of a permissible delay in the performance of this obligation).
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however, to construe the obligation of Israel to grant such
citizenship as one that will have consolidated only after the passage
of a reasonable adjustment period, which allows Israel to narrow the
scope of annexation through the removal of settlements.
It would fall to the international community of states to
determine, in view of the future conduct of Israel, what amounts to
a reasonable adjustment period. Matthew Waxman has observed
that “[f]or the most part . . . application and enforcement of
international law are decentralized, occur outside formal
international institutions, and remain largely the province of
states.” 288 Because states are the primary compliance agents with
regard to international law, the content of a state’s obligations under
international law depends on the views of other states. As noted by
Andrew Guzman and Timothy Meyer, “obligations are, to a large
extent, in the eye of the beholder. In a legal system in which
enforcement relies on self-help by the law’s subjects, those subjects’
perceptions as to what an obligation requires effectively define the
obligation.” 289 Presumably, an ICJ Advisory Opinion construing
what amounts to a “reasonable adjustment period” would carry
considerable weight in forging the views of the international
community of states on this matter.
V. CONCLUSION
The annexationist policies of Israel in the occupied West Bank
give rise to flagrant discrimination between the population of Israel
and the Palestinian population of the West Bank, which has the
distinguishing marks of a colonial regime. Such discrimination is
the result of the denial of Israeli citizenship to West Bank
Palestinians, and of Israel treating the occupied territory as its own,
without assuming in relation to the local population the duties that
a sovereign has toward its nationals.
This Article has explored a path in international law for
recognizing the right of the Palestinian population of the West Bank
288
Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form and Substance of the
UN Charter Regime, 24 EURO. J. INT’L L. 151, 153 (2013).
289
Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 171, 174 (2010).
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to Israeli citizenship. The Article showed that, to the extent that
Israel is deemed to have annexed a given area of the West Bank, it is
required under treaty law to grant its citizenship to many of the
Palestinian residents of such territory. Moreover, emerging norms
of customary international law would require Israel to grant its
citizenship to all Palestinians residing in an area of the West Bank
annexed by Israel.
The Article argued further that the enterprise of Israeli
settlements across the West Bank amounts to annexation, which
currently extends to the entire territory of the West Bank. Hence,
unless Israel narrows the scope of annexation, within a reasonable
time period, by removing many of the settlements, Israel’s
obligations under existing and emerging norms of IHRL concerning
the right to citizenship would apply to the relationship between
Israel and all West Bank Palestinians.
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